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Many modern systems and collections of components/devices can be represented as
complex networks. These networks, such as the cyberspace, internet, power grids, and water
supply chains, are expected to exhibit high-reliability levels since failures of these systems
can lead to catastrophic cascading events. As a result, enhancing our understanding of the
mechanisms behind the functionality and reliability of such networks is the key to ensure
the security, sustainability, and resilience of most modern critical infrastructures. While
there exists a broad variety of statistical methods for assessing the reliability of networks,
most existing techniques utilize only a single network topological metric. There is an urgent
need to develop advanced methodologies that can systematically assess the risk, robustness,
reliability, or vulnerability of a network and compare the risks of different networks.
In this thesis, we develop a novel stochastic modeling approach based on multiple interdependent topological measures of complex networks. The key engine behind our approach is
to evaluate the dynamics of multiple network motifs as descriptors of the underlying network
topology and its response to adverse events. Under a framework of the gamma degradation
model, we develop a formal statistical framework for the analysis of reliability and robustness
of a single complex network as well as for assessing differences in reliability properties exhibited by two different networks. We validate the proposed methodology with extensive Monte
Carlo simulation studies and illustrate the utility of the proposed approach by performing a
vulnerability analysis of European power grid networks under various targeted attacks.
v

Furthermore, we also consider cyber systems and computer infrastructures for commerce
and communications such as cyberspace, the Internet, electronic payment systems. Cybersecurity insurance is one of the possible ways to manage risk exposure for these complex
cyber networks. Therefore, comprehending how vulnerable is a cyber or physical network
to attacks or failures and assessing the risks of a complex network is of great interest. To
understand the risks of complex networks, we propose a modified Wiener process model
for the degeneration of the network functionality upon the removal of nodes due to attacks
or malfunctions. We also propose three statistical testing procedures based on the Wiener
process model to compare the risk and resilience of two different networks, which can be
used to comparing risks in the cybersecurity insurance domain. The proposed methodologies can be applied to any topological measures of network robustness or risk. A practical
data analysis for a peer-to-peer file-sharing network is presented to illustrate the proposed
model and methods. Monte Carlo simulations are used to evaluate the performance of the
proposed methodologies and practical recommendations are provided.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Reliability and robustness analysis for complex systems is one of the important topics in
system design and analysis, which has a wide range of applications in power systems, peerto-peer (P2P) networks, blockchain, and financial systems, etc. In recent years, complex
systems such as power systems and financial systems have posed more potential threats of
cyber-attacks. Therefore, to better assess the behavior of complex systems under attacks and
control and minimize the cost of failure, reliability and robustness analysis can be used to
detect the proper resilience metrics and robustness structures. The evaluation of reliability
and resilience is one of the key aspects of the design and planning of complex systems. In this
dissertation, we illustrate the utility of the robustness metrics and apply different stochastic
models for accessing the reliability of complex networks.
In this chapter, we first introduce the graph representation of networks and the concept of
motif-based analysis of complex networks. Then, we review some stochastic process models
that will be applied in the methodologies proposed in this thesis.

1.2. Graph representation of networks

A graph structure can be represented as G = {V, E, W }, where V is a node set with
cardinality (the number of elements in a set) |V| of N , E ⊆ V × V is an edge set, and W is
1

the adjacency matrix of G, which is an N × N nonnegative symmetric matrix with entries
{ωij }1≤i,j≤N , i.e., ωij 6= 0 for any eij ∈ E and ωij = 0, otherwise. In our study, we consider
unweighted and undirected graph, i.e., ωij = 1 and eij = eji ∈ E, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Hence,
we suppress the notation of the adjacency matrix in the graph representation and represent
the graph as G = {V, E}, where V = {v1 , v2 , . . . , vn } (where n is the number of nodes in
graph G) is the node set and E ⊆ {(vi , vj )|vi , vj ∈ V} is the edge set. In the unweighted
graph, edge weights are binary, i.e., ei,j = 1 if there is an edge between nodes i and j and 0
otherwise. In contrast, in weighted graph, the edge weights are real numbers which represent
the similarity or relatedness between two nodes.
Graphs are the most widely used representation to study the information management
and hidden patterns among the elements in the complex system [10]. In recent decades, the
analysis of complex systems with graph theory has been studied and applied to solve many
real-world problems. For example, for the protein-protein interactions (PPI) in a cell that
describe the physical contacts of high specificity established between molecules, although
there are a bunch of methods have been proposed to detect PPI [50, 63, 108], these methods
may not be able to capture the information about fraction of existing interactions. To
capture the interactions between two proteins, Brohée and van Helden [17] and Sprinzak et
al. [103] considered the interaction between proteins as interaction graph where the nodes
represent proteins and edges represent the interaction between two proteins. Equipped with
graph theory, the descriptive statistics, e.g., the distribution of node degree, graph diameter
can help better understand the relationship between the organization and functionality of
PPI.
Given the rising complexity of modern economies and societies, power systems are the
backbone of modern life. In order to study the design and performance of power systems,
engineers are required to understand the components in a power system and assess the
reliability of the power system. Reliability evaluation is very critical for the planning and
operation of power systems, where it can ensure robust performance and maximize the
2

plant availability under normal and faulty operational scenarios. Analysis of power networks
in electrical engineering [11, 13, 72] provides many effective metrics (e.g., resourcefulness,
adaptability, and rapid recovery) and methods to evaluate and compare the resilience between
different power systems. However, these metrics and methods may not efficiently capture
the geometric and topological information from power systems. To enhance the learning of
feature representations and the ability to model complex hidden information, graph theory
has been applied to the robustness studies of power systems [37]. For power systems, Watts
[118] treated the Western States Power Grid of the US as an unweighted network, where
the nodes in the graph represent generators, transformers, and substations. In addition to
power systems, there are numerous applications of graphs for network analysis in different
disciplines, for example, Anand et al. [7] examined the role of macroeconomic fluctuations of
a financial system via using a network structure where the nodes are international/domestic
banks. Dunne et al. [35] converted food-web data to the network structure and study its
topological properties via clustering coefficients and degree distributions.

1.3. Motif-based analysis of complex networks

The evaluation of complex network resilience is challenging due to the complex intradependencies and inter-dependencies structures generated from different types of nodes and
edges. Traditional graph metrics such as betweenness centrality (BC), graph diameter (D),
average path length (APL), clustering coefficient (CC), critical threshold fc based on the
giant component assessment [4, 31, 130], and estimated scale parameter γ from the approximating exponential cumulative degree distribution [92] can be used to describe the network
topology and quantify network robustness. For example, BC is the fraction of shortest paths
that pass through each node where the range of BC score is between 0 and 1; CC (Cu ) is
the number of connected pairs between the 1-hop neighborhood of the target node u; D
(du,v ) is the average length (i.e., number of edges) of the shortest path between nodes u
and v. The directions of these vulnerability metrics change in response to the increase of
3

resilience/robustness of a network can be described as follows:
APL ↓ D ↓ CC ↑ BC ↓ fc ↑ γ ↓ .
In other words, lower APL, lower D, higher CC, lower BC, higher fc , and lower γ are typically
considered to be associated with small world-ness and higher resilience.
However, traditional resilience metrics have three main drawbacks: (i) these global-level
metrics tend to focus on global topological information and thus, they may fail to capture
the hidden mechanisms such as local information from communities and local substructures;
for instance, the BC score always uses for flow network which can capture the traffic capacities between nodes, however, it has been shown that the BC score may not be appropriate
when there exists loop structures (i.e., higher-order structures) in flow network [41]; (ii) the
evaluation results from these traditionally resilience metrics may not be consistent, i.e., one
network can have both low APL (the lower APL, the higher topological resiliency of the
network is) and low CC (the higher CC, the higher topological resiliency of the network
is). Furthermore, we found that, under different attack strategies, the evaluation results
from these traditional resilience metrics can be different; (iii) the focus of these traditional
graph metrics is mostly on critical components/nodes (i.e., without all connected components/nodes are considered).
Due to these drawbacks, to better assess the network resilience, we consider the local
topological information from the topological perspective by encoding richer topological information via higher-order connections. In recent years, the analysis of the higher-order
structure of complex networks has been proposed to learn the functionality and representation of graph structure data and attract a growing interest [30, 94, 126]. One of the
most representative higher-order structure features is network motifs, which are recurrent
multi-node topological patterns that tend to appear more often than it would be expected
in a randomized network. Network motifs are first introduced by Alon [6] in the transcrip-

4

tional regulation network of bacteria and widely used in cellular networks of transcriptionregulation and protein-protein interaction. Different from regular resilience metrics, network
motifs can capture the prominent connectivity patterns which are essential to understanding
the node and structural information in the network. It is worth noting that different types
of network motifs have different functionalities and focuses, for example, feed-forward loop
(FFL) [28, 70] constitutes a gene circuit that can be used to model the correlation between
multiple circuit architectures and network motifs connected by the minimum spanning tree
format can degrade the dynamic stability of power systems.

Figure 1.1: Higher-order structures are captured by network motifs. All connected 3-node
and 4-node undirected motifs (left) and all connected 3-node directed motifs (right).

Formally, let G = (V, E) and G0 = (V 0 , E 0 ) be two undirected graphs. Graph G0 is a
sub-graph of graph G if V 0 ⊆ V and E 0 ⊆ E. If G0 ⊆ G contains all edges between u and v
(u, v ∈ V 0 ), then G0 is called an induced sub-graph of G. Broadly speaking, network motifs
are induced `-node subgraphs of G, ` > 2. While in the earlier studies, only subgraphs G0 that
occur more or less frequently than expected, have been called network motifs. Nowadays,
the term network motif is referred generally to all induced subgraphs G0 . Figure 1.1 presents
some commonly used higher-order structures including the undirected 4-node motifs as well
as the directed and undirected 3-node motifs. Following [30, 97], we primarily focus on
4-node motifs as descriptors of complex network response to disruptive events.
There exist many algorithms to count the exact number of network motifs via enumerating and sampling subgraphs, for example, RANDESU [120], MFinder [75], MAVISTO [96],
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and GTrieScanner [89]. Based on the ESU-tree structure, the RANDESU motif finder algorithm is less dependent on the size of the graph and thus is significantly faster than other
existing approaches. In our experiments, we utilize the FANMOD tool [121] for motif computations, which implements the RANDESU algorithm. It worth mentioning that the detected
network motifs can be fed into the statistical and machine learning models for different tasks.

1.4. Stochastic Process Models

In engineering and sciences, degradation process is defined as a gradually and irreversible accumulation loss of system functionality during system life cycle or significant
attacks [73, 100]. In order to characterize the evolutionary dynamics of degradation signals
and measure the performance of system under attacks, there are many degradation data
analysis methodologies and degradation models have been developed, which utilize the measurements of degradation signals to estimate the failure time and quantify the robustness
level of the system. Some commonly used models are stochastic process models [61, 112]
and Markov chain models [27, 43]. For stochastic process models, gamma process model,
Wiener process model, and inverse-Gaussian process model are widely used to model the
degradation processes of systems.
The Wiener process model is one of the greatest assets of the Markov processes due to
the attractive theoretical properties of normal distribution [106, 125, 127, 129]. Usually,
the degradation process of the target complex system can be characterized by a normal
distribution when the degradation process is non-monotonic over time. For the cumulative
degradation value of the system i at time point tk , denoted as Di,k , we consider Di,k follows
a Wiener process with drift rate µi > 0 and diffusion coefficient σi > 0. Then, Di,k has the
following properties:
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1. Di,0 = 0, i.e., the degradation value is 0 at the initial time point;
2. For any time sequence, i.e., 0 < t1 < t2 < · · · tk < · · · < tn (where k ∈ [1, n] and n represents the total number of time points), the increments Di,k − Di,k−1 are independent
with each other;
3. The increment between any two time points Di,k − Di,q (where k 6= q) follows the
normal distribution with mean µi and variance σi2 .

Given the increment yi,k = Di,k − Di,k−1 and the parameter set Θi = (µi , σi ), the probability
density function (PDF) of yi,k is given by
(yi,k − µi )2
1
√
exp −
, −∞ < yi,k < ∞.
fW (yi,k ) =
2σi2
2πσi
"

#

(1.1)

Although the Wiener process model can provide efficiency and remarkable performance
for different datasets, it may not be precise enough to model monotonic degradation processes
due to the degradation signals of the Wiener process model can increase and decrease over
time. Fortunately, the gamma process model has been proven to be an appropriate model for
the degradation signals that are monotonically accumulated over time (e.g., the light intensity
of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and corrosion of materials [9, 78, 101, 113]). Similar to the
Wiener process, the gamma process model also belongs to the class of Markov processes,
i.e., a stochastic process with independent and non-negative increments. In the gamma
process model, we assume that the cumulative degradation Yi of system i at time point tk
follows a gamma distribution with shape parameter λi > 0, scale parameter βi > 0 where
are constants. The PDF of yi,k can be formulated as
fG (yi,k ) =
where Γ(z) =

λi −1
yi,k

Γ(λi )βiλi

R ∞ z−1
x exp(−x)dz.
0

!

yi,k
exp −
,
βi

yi,k > 0,

(1.2)

Note that yi,k can be viewed as an increment in the

degradation processes.
7

However, there are some datasets which both the Wiener process and gamma process
cannot provide a well fit, e.g., GaAs Lasers data [114]. When both Wiener and gamma processes cannot provide unreliable results, one can consider the inverse-Gaussian (IG) process
proposed by Wasan [116], which was widely used for monotonic degradation path. The IG
process has been studied and extended to handle covariates and random effects [114]. The
IG process model is a natural alternative solution for degradation process modeling. To
utilize the IG process, we assume that the degradation process follows an IG process, i.e.,
each increment yi,k of system i at time point tk is statistical independent and has an IG distribution, denoted as IG(δi , ηi ), where δi > 0 is the mean which represents the degradation
rate and ηi > 0 is the shape parameter which does not have direct physical meaning. Then,
the PDF of yi,k is given by
fIG (yi,k ) =

s

ηi
ηi (yi,k − δi )2
exp
−
, yi,k > 0.
2πyi,k 3
2δi2 yi,k
!

(1.3)

1.5. Synopsis of the Thesis

After years of research and practice, achievements have been made in utilizing network
motifs for the evaluation of network robustness, node classification, and network trend forecasting. For instance, Dey et al. [30] evaluated power system reliability using network motif
concentrations calculated under a node-centrality-based attack. Yin et al. [126] developed
a spectral graph clustering method based on eigenvalues and eigenvectors of network motifbased matrix. Wang et al. [111] presented a principal component analysis (PCA) that
characterizes node importance in biological networks using network motifs. Tsourakakis et
al. [107] developed a scalable graph clustering approach based on graph motifs. Hochreiter
and Schmidhuber [46] and Chen and Ng [21] considered deep learning methods such as the
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural networks for model the token price time series
data based on network motifs. Lee et al. [58] utilized weighted multi-hop motif adjacency
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matrices to capture higher-order neighborhoods for node classification in graph convolution
networks. In this thesis, we further consider using network motifs to assess the robustness
and reliability of complex networks.
Due to the random behaviour in reliability engineering, such as the stochastic nature
of the failure, stochastic models have played an important role in reliability engineering
Stochastic model-based reliability, resilience, and similarity analysis have been developed
in the literature. For example, Ng et al. [78] proposed a stochastic gamma process model
for quantifying the similarity of two dissolution profiles. Wang et al. [115] utilized the
generalized Wiener process for residual life estimation about crack size of product. Lawless
and Crowder [57] constructed a tractable gamma-process model for Hudak Crack-growth
Data [49] by incorporating random effects and covariates. Wang et al. [114] applied the
IG process model for degradation GaAs lasers datasets and developed maximum likelihood
inference. There is an increasing research interest in integrating Bayesian framework with
Wiener process models [62, 119] for degradation signals of multiple-phase characteristics. In
this thesis, we attempt to address two important questions: (i) how network motifs can be
used to assess resilience of complex systems; and (ii) how to leverage network motifs and
stochastic process models to facilitate effective applications to resilience analysis on complex
systems under various types of intentional attacks. Here, to model the data for assessing
the reliability of complex networks with specific data structures, we modify some existing
degradation process models for this purpose. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed
models are the first attempt in the direction of using stochastic process models equipped
with local topological information for complex network resilience evaluation. In a broad
sense, assessing robustness and reliability of complex systems is crucial, for power companies
to improve power system security margins, for cyber insurance providers to deliver the risk
for insured individuals/companies, for governments to take the most optimal policy action
while minimizing the negative impact from attacks or failures.
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This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we focus on developing a novel stochastic
modeling approach based on multiple independent local topological measures of complex
network. First, we propose a modified gamma degradation model that takes network motifs
as input. Then, we construct the likelihood function through the joint distribution of network
motifs and propose a new statistical procedure for testing potential differences in network
motifs exhibited by two networks. In our experiments, we illustrate the utility of the proposed
motif-based methodology in application to vulnerability analysis of the European power grid
networks and synthetic power systems under a broad range of hazardous scenarios. To
assess the performance of the proposed approach under model uncertainties, we also preform
extensive Monte Carlo simulation studies.
In Chapter 3, we propose a modified Wiener process model for the evaluation of network
functionality under cyber attacks. First, we show the graph representation of the cyber
network and utilize topological measures for evaluating the robustness/loss of availability
of a network. Then, the proposed Wiener process model is used to model the dynamics of
a cyber network losing its functionality/connectivity upon the removal of nodes. Different
statistical testing procedures for comparing the risks of two networks are also presented. We
conduct experiments on real data sets of the Gnutella peer-to-peer (P2P) cyber networks.
Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of the proposed model and methods using a Monte
Carlo simulation study.
In Chapter 4, we conclude that our proposed modified stochastic process models equipped
with network motifs are able to accurately classify resilience of complex networks under
attacks. Extensive Monte Carlo simulation studies based on a parametric model and nonparametric resampling verify the effectiveness of our proposed methodologies. In general,
our work enables accurate robustness and reliability evaluation of complex networks, which
provides important insights into the organization and planning of various complex systems.
Besides evaluating the robustness of complex systems, the qualitative and quantitative
results based on our proposed models would be crucial for data-driven understanding of com10

plex system operation, that can help domain experts for effective real-time decision-making.
For future research, we plan to integrate other state-of-the-arts higher-order connectivity patterns into time- and state-dependent Markov degradation models for learning the dynamic
behavior of specific components under attacks and for discovering correlations between different higher-order connectivity patterns from complex systems.
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CHAPTER 2
Understanding Power Grid Network Vulnerability through the Stochastic Lens of Network
Motif Evolution

Many cyber-physical systems can be represented as complex networks. These networks
such as the internet, power grids, and supply chains, are expected to exhibit high reliability
levels since their failures can lead to catastrophic cascading events. As a result, enhancing
our understanding of mechanisms behind functionality of such networks is the key toward
ensuring security, sustainability, and resilience of most modern critical infrastructures. While
there exists a broad variety of methods for assessing reliability of networks, most existing
techniques utilize only a single network topological metric. In this chapter we develop a
new stochastic model approach based on multiple interdependent topological measures of
complex networks. The key engine behind our approach is to evaluate dynamics of multiple
network motifs as descriptors of the underlying network topology and its response to adverse
events. Under a framework of the gamma degradation family of models, we develop a
formal statistical inference for analysis of reliability and robustness levels of a single complex
network as well as for assessing differences in reliability properties exhibited by two different
networks. Our studies on EU and US power grid networks indicate that the new approach
delivers competitive performance, while requiring substantially less information about the
underlying systems.

12

2.1. Introduction: Motivation and Overview

Reliability analysis of complex networks and, particularly, power grids nowadays constitutes one of the most actively developing interdisciplinary research directions, largely due
to its key role in facilitating functionality, sustainability and resilience of modern critical
infrastructures under random failures and targeted attacks [see, for example, 1, 34, 36, and
references therein].
A conventional approach to address power grid network reliability is to assess dynamics
of the graph structure described by various network topological characteristics such as, for
instance, betweenness, clustering coefficient, and average path length, under adverse events
[25, 33, 44, 81]. However, some recent studies, e.g., [30, 74, 93, 97] show that network
robustness is also intrinsically connected to higher order network substructures, or network
motifs. Network motifs, or recurrently re-appearing subgraphs, have been first analyzed in
conjunction with biological systems [99] and later network motifs has been found to show
high utility in understanding functionality of many complex phenomena, from gene-to-gene
interaction to brain connectome to finance [see, e.g., 8, 52, 110, and references therein]. For
instance, using the framework of ordinary differential equations, Schultz et al. [97] showed
that abundance of tree-like structured motifs in the underlying power grid network leads
to higher system instability and changing at least one tree-like motif to a cycle motif may
result in improving the system response to perturbations. In turn, Dey et al. [30] showed
how a nonparametric concept of data depth can be used to assess network resilience based
on evolution of multiple motifs under attacks.
However, neither of these network motif studies offer a formal statistical inferential procedure to understand which motif or a subset thereof is important and how to test for differences
in reliability levels of networks in terms of their motifs. In this chapter we aim to address
this knowledge gap and develop statistical inference for accessing network reliability based on
network motifs. Since network motifs reflect system connectivity while the system response
13

to disruptive events intrinsically depends on the network connectivity, modeling evolution of
network motifs under random failures or intentional attacks can provide an insight on the
power grid response and overall system reliability under hazards. Our key approach is based
on viewing the gradually decreasing number of multiple network motifs under hazardous
scenarios as a degradation process [14] and then developing a gamma degradation model to
capture properties of the resulting network evolution [22, 64, 78]. In turn, assessing multiple
degradation measures allows for better characterization of the system functionality under
attacks and random failures.
There are numerous engineering studies on evaluating and predicting system reliability
using degradation models [e.g., 42, 65, 80]. One of the commonly used degradation models is the gamma degradation model which describes the degradation process by a gamma
process with stationary increments (decrements). However, neither a gamma process nor
a degradation framework, in general, have ever been used before to address the important
questions on network reliability described via network motifs and other network topological
descriptors. In contrast to currently available techniques, the proposed methodology allows
us to utilize the entire range of structure-dependent network motifs to conduct statistical
inference on the network robustness and reliability, to access differences between the target
network and any other networks, and to provide a vulnerability ranking of networks under
various targeted attacks. In addition, we propose a novel network motifs importance ranking
statistical test – partial motifs test – which provide a measure of importance of each network
motif in identifying the difference in vulnerability between networks.

2.2. Background on Network Motifs

The concept of network motifs is first introduced by Shen-Orr et al. [99] in which network
motifs are discovered in the gene regulation network of the bacteria in which the experiments
showed that each of the motifs carries out a unique information processing function in the
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biological network. Later network motifs have been proven to play a fundamental role in
understanding hidden mechanisms behind functionality of many complex systems, from brain
connectome to protein-protein interactions to power grids [see, for example, 30, 82, 126, and
references therein]. More details of network motifs can be found in Chapter 1.

2.3. Stochastic Process Model and Statistical Hypothesis Tests

2.3.1. Modified Gamma Degradation Model

A degradation process in natural science and engineering is the process that a system or
decreases in performance, reliability or life span of assets gradually and irreversibly over time.
For example, lithium-ion batteries degrade gradually after they put into use and the capacity
ratio at the charging cycles of lithium-ion batteries are recorded over time as the degradation
measurements for system health management purposes. Degradation modeling attempts to
characterize progression of the system degradation measurements. Different degradation
models have been proposed and studied in the literature and gamma degradation model
is one of the commonly used stochastic processes used to model a variety of monotonic
degradation phenomena in engineering and science [see, for example, 19, 39, 76, 128, and
references theerein].
In this subsection, we consider network motif counts as the degradation measurement
and introduce a modified gamma degradation model for these degradation measurements.
Since network motifs are subgraphs that highly depend on the network structure and the
numbers of `-node motifs remain in the network structure under attacks can be viewed as a
monotone decreasing degradation process, therefore, a gamma degradation model is adopted
here for modeling and statistical analysis. Since the counts of `-node motifs are dependent,
it is reasonable to model these counts using a shared parameter. Suppose that I networks
are under intentional attacks, the remaining numbers of the `-node motifs are observed at an
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observation point tk , k = 1, . . . , K, where K is the total number of observation points. For
instance, the observation point tk can be considered as a specific fraction of random/selective
nodes (e.g., nodes with the highest degrees and nodes with the largest betweenness) being
removed from the network. Let xi,j,k be the number of the j-th `-node motif for the network
i at observation point tk , j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . , K. For the 4-node motifs, J = 6 and
the six 4-node motifs are presented in Figure 1.1 (see Chapter 1). Under the logarithmic
transformation, we define yi,j,k = log(xi,j,k /xi,j,k+1 ) and assumed that yi,j,k are independent
and identical gamma random variables with shape parameter λi,j > 0, and scale parameter
iid

βi > 0, denoted as yi,j,k ∼ Ga(λi,j ∆ti , βi ). Here, we assume that each `-node motif has its
own shape parameter and different `-node motifs share the same scale parameter in a gamma
process model. When the attack sequence is taken at points with equally spaced, without
iid

loss of generality, we can consider yi,j,k ∼ Ga(λi,j , βi ). With probability density function
(PDF)
λ

f (yi,j,k ) =
where Γ(z) =

−1

i,j
yi,j,k

!

λ

Γ(λi,j )βi i,j

yi,j,k
exp −
,
βi

yi,j,k > 0,

(2.1)

R ∞ z−1
x exp(−x)dz.
0

The parameter βi in the gamma degradation model in Equation (2.1) is intended to
capture the dependence among the counts of different motifs within the same network. Based
on the observed values (i.e., the motif counts) xi,j,k and the proposed gamma degradation
model, the likelihood function can be expressed as
L(θ) =

I
Y

Li (θi ),

(2.2)

i=1

where
Li (θi ) =

J Y
K
Y

λ

−1

i,j
yi,j,k

λ

j=1 k=1

Γ(λi,j )βi i,j

!

yi,j,k
exp −
,
βi

(2.3)

θ = (θ1 , . . . , θI ), θi = (λi,1 , . . . , λi,J , βi )T are the parameters vectors. Based on the functions
presented in Equations (2.2) and (2.3), the log-likelihood function for the i-th network can
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be expressed as

li (θi ) =

J 
X

− K ln (Γ(λi,j )) − Kλi,j ln (βi ) + (λi,j − 1)

j=1

= −K

ln (yi,j,k ) −

PK

k=1
J
X

ln (Γ(λi,j )) − K ln (βi )

j=1

PJ

−

K
X

j=1

J
X

λi,j +

j=1

PK

k=1

β1

yi,j,k

J
X

(λi,j − 1)

j=1

K
X

k=1

yi,j,k



βi

ln (yi,j,k )

k=1

(2.4)

.

Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 hold for the log-likelihood function of the i-th network and
ensure that the proposed gamma degradation model is identifiable.

Theorem 2.3.1 Constancy on the boundary:

lim

sup

λi,j →∞ max(y

li (θi ) → −∞.

i,j,k )≤βi

Theorem 2.3.2 Negative-definiteness of Hessian matrix H(θi ) ∈ R(J +1)×(J +1) .

Proofs are provided in Appendix A.1.
Since there are situations that the counts of motifs at different time points are equal or
the counts of motifs can be zero, to incorporate these cases in the likelihood function, we
propose the following methods based on the stationary and independent increments property
of the gamma process. In Figure 2.1, we provide some toy examples to describe the three
specific cases:
• Case 1: xi,j,1 > xi,j,2 > · · · > xi,j,k−1 = xi,j,k > xi,j,k+1 > xi,j,k+2 > · · · > xi,j,K 6= 0
In this case, we have yi,j,k−1 = log(xi,j,k−1 /xi,j,k ) = 0 for xi,j,k−1 = xi,j,k . Since xi,j,. is
independent with each other, we can get log(xi,j,k−1 /xi,j,k+1 ) ∼ Ga(2λi,j , βi ) by adding
log(xi,j,k−1 /xi,j,k ) ∼ Ga(λi,j , βi ) and log(xi,j,k /xi,j,k+1 ) ∼ Ga(λi,j , βi ) together.
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• Case 2: xi,j,1 > xi,j,2 > · · · > xi,j,k−1 > xi,j,k = xi,j,k+1 = xi,j,k+2 = · · · = xi,j,K 6= 0
Similar to case 1, we can get log(xi,j,k−1 /xi,j,K ) ∼ Ga((K + 1 − k)λi,j , βi ).
• Case 3: xi,j,1 > xi,j,2 > · · · > xi,j,k−1 > xi,j,k = · · · = xi,j,k+w−1 > xi,j,k+w = · · · =
xi,j,K = 0
When 2 ≤ w < K − k, we can obtain log(xi,j,k−1 /xi,j,k+w−1 ) ∼ Ga(wλi,j , βi ) and omit
the number of the j-th `-node motif for the network i which is equal to zero.

Figure 2.1: Toy examples for Case 1 (left), Case 2 (center), and Case 3 (right), where x-axis
is the observation point and y-axis is the number of the j-th `-node motif for network i at
the observation point.

The maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the unknown model parameters can be
obtained by maximizing L(θ) with respect to θ. Here, we use the function constrOptim in R
[86] to maximize the likelihood function in order to obtain the corresponding MLEs subject
to the constraints λi,j > 0, βi > 0, i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J . In Appendix A.5, we provide
the computation time and memory usage for the computation procedures presented in this
chapter.

2.3.1.1. Likelihood Ratio Test on Network Motifs

Consider that the purpose of the study is to identify whether two networks are in the
same resilience level/group, we propose a likelihood ratio test with the gamma degradation
model to assess the statistical significance. We define the notation R(·) as the measure of
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robustness of a network, which can be evaluated in different ways depending on the context
and model under considerations. For instance, based on the gamma degradation model in
Section 2.3.1, R(·) can be evaluated based on the parameters in the gamma degradation
model. To evaluate and compare the robustness of two different networks, we consider the
likelihood ratio test for testing the hypotheses:
H0 :R(N etworki ) = R(N etworki0 )
versus H1 :R(N etworki ) 6= R(N etworki0 ).

(2.5)

Based on the gamma degradation model discussed in Section 2.3.1, the hypotheses in Equation (2.5) could be expressed as
H0 :βi = βi0 = β, λi,j = λi0 ,j = λj
versus H1 :βi 6= βi0 or λi,j 6= λi0 ,j for at least one pair of i and i0 .

(2.6)

From the Neyman-Pearson lemma, the likelihood ratio test statistic is defined as
Λ=

max{L(θ̂0 |H0 )}
max{L(θ̂1 |H1 )}

,

(2.7)

where θ̂0 is the MLE of θ under H0 and θ̂1 is the MLE of θ under H1 . In particular,
θ̂0 = (λ̂1 , . . . , λ̂J , β̂)T is the value of (λ1 , . . . , λJ , β)T that maximizes L(θ). In turn, θ̂1 =
(λ̂1,1 , . . . , λ̂1,J , β̂1 , . . . , λ̂I,1 , . . . , λ̂I,J , β̂I )T is the value that maximize the likelihood function
in Equation (2.2).
Wilks’ theorem suggests that the asymptotic distribution of the log-likelihood ratio statistic follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom q = (I − 1)(J + 1), i.e.,
D

−2 log(Λ) → χ2 (q). Hence, we reject the null hypothesis H0 in Equation (2.6) at α level if
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−2 log(Λ) > χ2α (q), and the p-value of the likelihood ratio test can be obtained as
Pr(χ2 (q) < −2 log(Λ)),

(2.8)

where χ2 (q) is a random variable that follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of
freedom q. Note that the p-value obtained from the likelihood ratio test can be used to
determine if two networks have the same level of resilience, robustness and reliability in
terms of the measure R(·). In particular, a smaller p-value (i.e., p-value closer to 0) indicates
that two networks have different levels of robustness and a larger p-value (i.e., p-value closer
to 1) indicates that two networks have similar levels of robustness. Therefore, the p-value
in Equation (2.8) can be used as a similarity measure between two networks in terms of
robustness.
2.3.2. Testing on Network Motif Importance

In addition to applying the likelihood ratio test based on all the `-node motifs to compare
two networks in terms of robustness, we consider performing the analysis based on a subset
of motifs as well as determining which motif contribute to the difference if the null hypothesis
in Equation (2.6) is rejected.

2.3.2.1. Hypothesis Testing for a Subset of Network Motifs

In motif-based network analysis, researchers found that some of the `-node (` = 3, 4) motifs may reveal the dynamic properties of network and clearly capture the network architectural principles [see 30, 83, 107]. For example, in biological networks such as gene regulatory
networks and protein-protein interaction networks, researchers found that the feed-forward
loop (FFL) motif (3-node motif: an input node, an output node, and an internal node) has
higher frequency in gene networks [6, 70] and the FFL motif has three important roles: (i)
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pulse generation; (ii) performing SUM (addition) function; (iii) generating non-monotonic
input functions for genes. In the context of power grid network, the detour motifs suggested
by [97] have been shown that it is important for enhancing the overall dynamical stability
of power grid networks. The sketch of a detour motif contains at least three nodes in which
the degree of the detour node is two and the degrees of the other nodes are greater than
or equal to two. In a simulation study of artificially power grids and a case study of the
northern European power grid [74], the tree-like dead ends (i.e., minimum spanning trees
where |E|= |V |−1) have shown to be weakening the stability of power grids. Hence, the
hypotheses in Equation (2.5) can be tested based on a subset of specific motifs. Using some
specific motifs that are known to be relate to the robustness of power grid network may
improve the detection accuracy and reduce the computational efforts.
In turn, in many applications it is possible that some motifs could not be observed in the
network, especially for smaller networks. For instance, the number of the j-th `-node motif
in the network i at any observation point, denoted as xi,j,· , can always equal to zero, i.e.,
there is no observed motif Mj in the network i. In this situation, the hypotheses in Equation
(2.5) can be tested based on a subset of motifs that are non-zero for the two networks under
consideration.

2.3.2.2. Determine which Network Motifs Contribute to the Difference

In comparing the network robustness between two networks based on the gamma degradation model and likelihood ratio test described in Section 2.3.1, if the null hypothesis in
Equation (2.6) is rejected, it will be interesting to determine which motif(s) is (are) contributed to the difference. This problem is similar to the paired comparisons after the
rejection of an overall F -test in regression analysis or analysis of variance (ANOVA). In
particular, in multiple regression with two or more explanatory variables, we are interested
in testing whether a certain subset of the regression coefficients are significant after the null
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hypothesis of an overall F -test is rejected. A partial F test that involves the comparison of
the sum of squared errors (SSE) of the reduced model (i.e., excluding the parameters hypothesized to be significant) to the SSE of the full model (including all the parameters) is used
for this purpose. Here, we propose a test for comparing network robustness based on motifs
using the concept of partial F test. Hence, we name this proposed test as partial-motifs test.
Suppose that the null hypothesis on N etworki and N etworki0 in Equation (2.6) is rejected, we propose a partial-motifs test procedure by focusing on a single shape parameter
λj̃ and assuming λi,j equals to λi0 ,j for j 6= j̃. The proposed partial-motifs test is summarized
in Algorithm 1. By implementing the partial-motifs tests for different values j̃ = 1, 2, . . . , J ,
the corresponding p-values can be used as difference factor and similarity factor for network
motifs categorization/contribution, which are used in describing influential power of motifs
in comparing the robustness of power grid networks.
Note that the proposed partial-motifs test considers testing different alternative hypotheses H1(j) (i.e., assuming only λi,j equals to λi0 ,j for j 6= j̃ in the alternative hypothesis H1 , see
Line 5 in Algorithm 1) with the same null hypothesis H0 . We can also consider another way
to implement the partial-motifs test by testing different null hypotheses H0(j) (i.e., assuming
only λi,j equals to λi0 ,j for j 6= j̃ in the null hypothesis H0 ) with the same null hypothesis
H1 . This partial-motifs test, namely the inverse-partial-motifs test, can be used to verify
the results of the partial-motifs test. These procedures will be illustrated in the numerical
example in Section 2.4.
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Algorithm 1 Partial Motifs Test
Input: Degradation J -node motifs data (X, X0 ) for Networki and Networki0
Output: p-values from leave-one-parameter-out hypotheses
H0 : βi = βi0 = β, λi,j = λi0 ,j = λj , where j = 1, . . . , J
for j ∈ {1, . . . , J } do
H1(j) : βi 6= βi0 , λi,j = λi0 ,j , λi,j̃ 6= λi0 ,j̃ , where j̃ 6= j
Feed (X, X0 ) into log-likelihood function Obtain MLEs



θ̂0 = (λ̂1 , . . . , λ̂J , β̂),



θ̂1(j) = (λ̂j , λ̂i,j̃ , λ̂i0 ,j̃ , β̂i , β̂i0 ),

Calculate LRTj = -2log

h

L(θ̂0 )
L(θ̂1(j) )

i

,

under H0
under H1(j)

θ̂1(j) is the MLE under H1(j)

Calculate the p-valuej = Pr(LRTj > χ2 (J )) based on the partial motifs test hypothesis
end
Compare the absolute differences among J scenarios between p-value = [p-value1 , . . . , pvalueJ ] from partial motifs test and the p-value∗ from the overall test

2.4. Analysis of Power Grid Network Data

2.4.1. Data Description

To illustrate utility of the new methodology, we study the data from the Union for
the Coordination of Transport of Electricity (UCTE) that includes power grid networks
of 15 European countries (https://www.ucte.org/). For illustrative purposes, we consider
six European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain. The nodes
in each network represent the various substations, and the edges represent the high voltage
transmission lines that connect different substations. To measure the remaining functionality
of power grid network, we focus on four types of 4-node motifs, M1 , M2 , M3 and M4 , in
Figure 1.1 because of motifs M5 or M6 are not available in some of the power grid networks.
The basic network structure information of six European power grid networks are presented
in Table 2.1.
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Country

# of nodes

# of edges

France

677

913

Germany

445

567

Italy

273

375

Poland

162

212

Romania

106

136

Spain

472

676

Table 2.1: Basic network structure information of six European power grids.

We measure system response to disruptive events using the degradation rates of motifs under attacks (i.e., removal of nodes in the network) using the parameters in the
gamma degradation model in Section 2.3.1. We focus on the degree-centrality-based attacks
in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 and consider other sequences of node removal (attacks) such
as the betweenness-centrality-based and eigenvector-centrality-based attacks. For degreecentrality-based attacks, the larger the degree of a node (i.e., more neighbors a node has),
the earlier the node is removed from the network.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the remaining (%) 4-node motifs (M1 , M2 , M3 , and M4 ) of the
six European power grids graphically under degree-centrality-based attacks. Note that the
degradation rates of different 4-node motifs are different when the same fraction of nodes
have been removed. For example, we find that the motif M3 in Poland (black curve) degrades
faster than other countries, however, the motif M4 in Poland degrades slower than the other
countries. It is clear that one may not conclude which power grid is more robust or fragile
with the behavior of a single 4-node motif as a fraction of nodes have been removed.
2.4.2. Comparing Network Vulnerability

In this subsection, we apply the proposed gamma degradation model to fit the data
presented in Table 2.1 and the estimates of the model parameters are presented in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Degradation of motifs of six power grids under degree-based attack.

In order to assess the similarity of the two power grids in terms of robustness, we compute
the p-value of the test for hypotheses in Equation (2.6) for each pair of power grids based
on the likelihood ratio test. For comparative purposes, we present the p-values through
the clustered heatmap in Figure 2.3 where the p-values are indicated by the heatmap color
(yellow: high, dark blue: low). Based on the heatmap in Figure 2.3, we can observe, for
example, in contrast to other power grids, the robustness of the Italy power grid is similar
to that of the Germany power grid; moreover, France power grid confers similar robustness
to Spain power grid. To evaluate the rankings of the six power grids in terms of robustness,
we can obtain two possible robustness rankings based on the heatmap:
[Italy, Germany] > [Romania, Poland] > [France, Spain]
or [France, Spain] > [Romania, Poland] > [Italy, Germany]
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Figure 2.3: Heatmap with pairwise p-value between six European power grids.

To evaluate which ranking is more probable, we consider two extensions of the proposed
gamma degradation model. First, we calculate the average degradation rate for the i-th
power grid as
Āi =

λi,1 × βi + · · · + λi,J × βi
,
J

(2.9)

where Āi is the average of the expected values of gamma random variables. The smaller
the Āi , the more robust the i-th network. Based on the values of Ā in Table 2.2, we can
observe the average degradation rates of the motifs of Italy and Germany are much smaller
than those of Romania, Poland, France and Spain, and the average of degradation rates of
Romania and Poland are smaller than those of France and Spain. Second, we can compare
the robustness between Spain and Italy based on assuming equal scale parameters for Italy
and Spain (i.e., through combining the Italy and Spanish power grids) and then compare
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the shape parameters between Italy and Spain power grids (see Table 2.3). From Table 2.3,
we observe that all of the shape parameters in the Spain power grid is larger than those in
the Italy power grid. Hence, we conclude that the vulnerability ranking of these six power
grids is
[Italy, Germany] > [Romania, Poland] > [France, Spain].

Degree-based attack
Country

λ1

λ2

λ3

λ4

β

Ā

France

4.055

3.399

5.295

2.576

0.060

0.230

Germany

3.082

2.445

2.383

2.161

0.069

0.174

Italy

2.368

2.270

2.437

3.080

0.063

0.159

Poland

1.917

1.633

2.245

0.721

0.125

0.203

Romania

1.627

1.477

0.967

1.033

0.162

0.207

Spain

4.544

3.390

4.483

3.252

0.072

0.282

Table 2.2: Estimates of the gamma degradation model parameters for six power grids
dataset under degree-based attack.

Degree-based attack
Country

λ1

λ2

λ3

λ4

β

Italy

2.285

2.191

2.349

2.964

0.066

Spain

4.939

3.673

4.876

3.534

0.066

Table 2.3: Estimates of the gamma degradation model parameters for Italy and Spain
power grids under degree-based attack with assuming βItaly = βSpain = β.

2.4.3. Determine which Motifs Contribute to the Difference

In this subsection, we use the power grids of Germany and Spain to illustrate the partialmotifs tests proposed in Section 2.3.1.1. Based on the gamma degradation model and the
likelihood ratio test, testing the hypotheses in Equation (2.6) for the power grids of Germany
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and Spain, the p-value is 0.0074 and the null hypothesis H0 – R(N etwork1 ) = R(N etwork2 ),
where 1 = Germany and 2 = Spain, is rejected at 1% level of significance. Therefore, we
conclude that the network robustness of the power grids of Germany and Spain are different
with 1% level of significance.
After rejecting the null hypothesis that the two power grids are the same in terms of
robustness, we would be interested in identify the similarity factor (motif/shape parameter)
and

difference

factor

(motif/shape

parameter)

and

identify

which

motif

decreases/increases the network robustness using the proposed partial-motifs test. For the
partial-motif tests, we fix the null hypothesis and consider four different alternative hypotheses for the power grids of Germany and Spain:
[I] Test for the parameter of motif M1 under H1(1) : H0 : β1 = β2 = β, λ1,1 = λ2,1 =
λ1 , λ1,2 = λ2,2 = λ2 , λ1,3 = λ2,3 = λ3 , λ1,4 = λ2,4 = λ4 versus H1(1) : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,1 =
λ2,1 = λ1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,3 6= λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 .
[II] Test for the parameter of motif M2 under H1(2) : H0 : β1 = β2 = β, λ1,1 = λ2,1 =
λ1 , λ1,2 = λ2,2 = λ2 , λ1,3 = λ2,3 = λ3 , λ1,4 = λ2,4 = λ4 versus H1(2) : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,2 =
λ2,2 = λ2 , λ1,1 6= λ2,1 , λ1,3 6= λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 .
[III] Test for the parameter of motif M3 under H1(3) : H0 : β1 = β2 = β, λ1,1 = λ2,1 =
λ1 , λ1,2 = λ2,2 = λ2 , λ1,3 = λ2,3 = λ3 , λ1,4 = λ2,4 = λ4 versus H1(3) : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,3 =
λ2,3 = λ3 , λ1,1 6= λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 .
[IV] Test for the parameter of motif M4 under H1(4) : H0 : β1 = β2 = β, λ1,1 = λ2,1 =
λ1 , λ1,2 = λ2,2 = λ2 , λ1,3 = λ2,3 = λ3 , λ1,4 = λ2,4 = λ4 versus H1(4) : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,4 =
λ2,4 = λ4 , λ1,1 6= λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,3 6= λ2,3 .
In the above four hypotheses, we assume that λi,j is equivalent to λi0 ,j in both the null and
alternative hypothesis, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. The p-values obtained from the above four hypotheses
are: p-valueI = 0.0054, p-valueII = 0.0046, p-valueIII = 0.0113, and p-valueIV = 0.0053.
Comparing these p-values, motif M3 exhibits somewhat more obvious difference because
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there is an increase of the absolute difference between p-values from the partial-motifs test
in hypotheses [III] above and the overall test in Equation (2.6).
To verify the conclusion here, we perform an inverse-partial- motifs test for λ1 , λ2 , λ3 ,
and λ4 . We fix the alternative hypothesis as the overall test and consider different null
hypotheses. The corresponding four different null hypotheses are:
[V] Test for the parameter of M1 under H0(1) : H0(1) : β1 6= β2 , λ1,1 = λ2,1 = λ1 , λ1,2 6=
λ2,2 , λ1,3 6= λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 versus H1 : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,1 6= λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,3 6=
λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 .
[VI] Test for the parameter of M2 under H0(2) : H0(2) : β1 6= β2 , λ1,2 = λ2,2 = λ2 , λ1,1 6=
λ2,1 , λ1,3 6= λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 versus H1 : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,1 6= λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,3 6=
λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 .
[VII] Test for the parameter of M3 under H0(3) : H0(3) : β1 6= β2 , λ1,3 = λ2,3 = λ3 , λ1,1 6=
λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 versus H1 : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,1 6= λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,3 6=
λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 .
[VIII] Test for the parameter of M4 under H0(4) : H0(4) : β1 6= β2 , λ1,4 = λ2,4 = λ4 , λ1,1 6=
λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,3 6= λ2,3 versus H1 : βi 6= βi0 , λ1,1 6= λ2,1 , λ1,2 6= λ2,2 , λ1,3 6=
λ2,3 , λ1,4 6= λ2,4 .
The p-values obtained from hypotheses [V]–[VIII] are: p-valueV = 0.2906, p-valueVI =
0.3814, p-valueVII = 0.0938, and p-valueVIII = 0.2913. We can observe that the p-values
corresponding to motif M3 is smaller than the others and the results achieve consistently
performance compared with the findings from the partial-motifs test. The partial-motifs
tests identify the 4-node motif M3 as the most informative measure for identifying the difference between two power networks. This finding agrees with the results discussed in [97]
in which the motif M3 (i.e., detour motif) has drastically impact on the power grid stability.

29

2.4.4. Comparison of Network Vulnerability under Different Attacks

As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, the nodes of a graph can be removed in different order based on different types of attacks. Instead of comparing the robustness of two power
grid networks, the proposed model and testing procedure can be applied to compare the
robustness of a power grid network under different target attacks. In this subsection, we
consider the comparisons of degree-centrality-based attacks, betweenness-centrality-based
attacks, and eigenvector-centrality-based attacks (i.e., the nodes are selected in the decreasing order of their degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality).
Figure 2.4 shows the degradation of 4-node motifs under the betweenness-centrality-based
attacks, i.e., the nodes in the network are removed sequentially from the highest to the lowest
betweenness centrality scores. We find that the motif degradation curves of the power grid
are substantially different from the corresponding curves under the degree-centrality-based
attacks (see Figure 2.2). The parameter estimates of the gamma degradation model and the
average degradation rates of the six European power grids based on betweenness-centralitybased attacks are presented in Table 2.4. Based on the average of degradation rates, Ā, in
Table 2.4, we obtain the ranking of the six European power grids in terms of robustness as
[Italy, Germany] > [Romania, France] > [Spain, Poland].

In contrast to the degree-centrality-based attacks, when the betweenness-centrality-based
attacks is considered, the most robust and the most fragile power grids are Germany and
Spain, respectively.
For eigenvector-centrality-based attacks, Figure 2.5 shows the motif degradation curves
of each power grid based on sequentially removing nodes following eigenvector centrality
scores. The degradation rates based on eigenvector-centrality-based attacks are noticeably
slower than the corresponding remaining motif change under degree-centrality-based and
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Figure 2.4: Degradation of motifs of six power grids under betweenness-based attacks.

betweenness-centrality-based attacks. The parameter estimates of gamma degradation model
and the average degradation rates of the six European power grids based on eigenvectorcentrality-based attacks are presented in Table 2.5. Under eigenvector-centrality-based attacks, the most robust power grid is still Germany, however, the most fragile power grid
is Poland. The implication of these results is that, under different attack strategies, the
robustness of network can be different.
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Betweenness-based attacks
Country

λ1

λ2

λ3

λ4

β

Ā

France

3.429

2.971

3.445

2.186

0.054

0.163

Germany

0.931

0.897

0.510

0.621

0.092

0.068

Italy

2.921

2.771

2.367

3.323

0.034

0.098

Poland

1.697

1.444

2.315

0.678

0.121

0.186

Romania

1.091

1.317

0.098

1.169

0.137

0.126

Spain

2.878

2.793

2.563

2.953

0.071

0.199

Table 2.4: Parameter estimates of the gamma degradation model for the six power grids
under betweenness-based attacks.

Figure 2.5: Degradation of motifs of six power grids under eigenvector-based attacks.
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Eigenvector-based attacks
Country

λ1

λ2

λ3

λ4

β

Ā

France

1.001

0.961

0.841

0.649

0.096

0.083

Germany

0.649

0.614

0.478

0.401

0.055

0.029

Italy

0.919

0.898

0.783

0.713

0.058

0.048

Poland

0.402

0.453

0.209

0.486

0.222

0.086

Romania

1.067

0.907

0.238

0.557

0.081

0.056

Spain

0.460

0.543

0.413

0.490

0.127

0.061

Table 2.5: Parameter estimates of the gamma degradation model for the six power grids
under eigenvector-based attacks.

Comparisons with more conventional global network-based vulnerability metrics are in
Appendix A.2.1.

We also compare the use of motifs with some state-of-the-art power

flow reliability measures for network vulnerability based on synthetic ACTIVSg500 and
ACTIVSg2000 power systems in Appendix A.2.2 (the data are publicly available from
https://electricgrids.engr.tamu.edu/). We emphasize that quantification of system resilience
based on optimal power flow information should be viewed as a valuable, complementary
rather than competing direction, especially in view of the fact that such resilience measures
based on power flow tend to be very-resource intensive and often limited by available data.
In Appendix A.3, we further justify the use of network motifs in network reliability analysis
by studying how network motifs affect the functionality of a power system under removal of
nodes or edges using the IEEE 118-Bus system.

2.5. Monte Carlo Simulation Studies

In this section, we verify the usefulness and study the properties of the proposed gamma
degradation model and hypothesis testing procedures using Monte Carlo simulation studies.
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2.5.1. Based on a Parametric Statistical Model

To evaluate the performances of the proposed model and test procedures, a Monte
Carlo simulation study with two networks (i.e., I = 2), four observed 4-node motifs (i.e.,
J = 4) and different numbers of observation points K = {10, 30}.

We consider the

gamma degradation model with original parameter vectors θ1 = {λ1,1 , λ1,2 , λ1,3 , λ1,4 , β1 } =
{3.0, 2.0, 3.0, 2.0, 0.1} and alternative parameter vectors θ2 = {aλ1,1 , aλ1,2 , aλ1,3 , aλ1,4 , β1 } =
{3a, 2a, 3a, 2a, 0.1}, where a = {0.1, . . . , 2.0}. The following steps are used to simulate the
rejection rate of the proposed likelihood ratio test procedure in Section 2.3.1.1:
Step 1: Generate yi,j,k based on the gamma distribution with shape λ = λi,j = aλi,j , and scale
β = βi , i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
Step 2: Set the each motif’s degradation at time t1 equals to 100%, (i.e., xi,j,1 = 1). Compute
xi,j,k+1 = xi,j,k /exp(yi,j,k ), i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
Step 3: Perform the likelihood ratio test presented in Section 2.3.1 based on the simulated data
and obtain the p-value.
Step 4: Repeat Step 1 to Step 3 N times. The simulated rejection rate is # {p-value < 0.05}/N .
The simulated rejection rates based on N = 10, 000 simulations are presented in Figure 2.6 and Table 2.6. We find that the simulated rejection rates increase when a increases
from 1.0 to 2.0 and when a decreases from 1.0 to 0.1. Under the null hypothesis (i.e., a = 1.0),
the simulated rejection rates are higher than the nominal level 0.05, especially when K = 10.
However, when the number of observation points increases from K = 10 to 30, the simulated
rejection rate gets closer to 0.05.
To validate the appropriateness of using the proposed gamma process model for the
remaining motifs data, we simulate 1,000 remaining motifs curves based on the fitted gamma
process models with the parameters in Tables 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5, along with the observed
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Rejection Rate for Different a's with m = 10 and m = 30
length of time

m = 10

m = 30

1.00

Rejection Rate

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

2

a

Figure 2.6: Simulated rejection rates for K = 10(red) and 30(blue) with a = {0.1, · · · , 2.0}.

remaining motifs curves. Plots of the simulated (blue) and observed (orange) remaining
motifs curves are presented in Figures 2.7, 2.8, 2.9. As Figures 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 demonstrate,
the observed remaining motifs curves for motifs M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 of the six power grids fall
within those simulated motifs curves, based on the proposed gamma process model (except
the curve for motif M3 of Poland power grid), which indicates that the proposed model
provides reasonable fits of the data. Note that some of the simulated motifs curves do not
contain the observed motif curve (e.g., motif M4 in Poland and Romania). This phenomenon
can be explained by the lower orders of these power grid networks (i.e, both Poland and
Romania have lowest numbers of nodes) and, as a result, lower representation of motif M4
in these networks.
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Rejection rate
a

Rejection rate

K = 10 K = 30

a

K = 10 K = 30

0.1

1.000

1.000

1.1

0.111

0.114

0.2

1.000

1.000

1.2

0.212

0.337

0.3

1.000

1.000

1.3

0.380

0.648

0.4

0.998

1.000

1.4

0.589

0.890

0.5

0.973

1.000

1.5

0.781

0.982

0.6

0.822

0.988

1.6

0.908

0.998

0.7

0.521

0.831

1.7

0.965

1.000

0.8

0.250

0.421

1.8

0.991

1.000

0.9

0.113

0.132

1.9

0.999

1.000

1.0

0.076

0.058

2.0

1.000

1.000

Table 2.6: Simulated rejection rate for different values of a = {0.1, · · · , 2.0} with
K = {10, 30}.

Figure 2.7: Simulated and observed motifs curves of the six power grids under degree-based
attacks.
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Figure 2.8: Simulated and observed motifs curves of the six power grids under betweennessbased attacks.

Figure 2.9: Simulated and observed motifs curves of the six power grids under eigenvectorbased attacks.
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2.5.2. Nonparametric Resampling of a Network

In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed model and test procedures when the
data are not generated from a parametric model, we conducted a simulation study based on
resampling of a power grid network. Specifically, we sample two sub-networks (sub-graphs)
from a power grid network in the UCTE power grid network data in Section 2.4 and apply
the proposed model and testing procedure for data analysis.
Here, we use the network sampling method called breadth-first sampling (BFS). Breadthfirst search is a classic graph traversal algorithm that starts from the chosen-seed and progressively explores all neighbors. Consequently, BFS obtains first the nodes closest to the
seed. Compared with random walk (RW), graph traversals (e.g., breadth-first search and
depth-first search) never revisits the same node. At the end of the process, if the graph is
connected, then all nodes will be visited. However, when using graph traversals for sampling,
we terminate after having collected a fraction δ < 1 of graph nodes.
In this simulation study, we consider the power grid networks of Germany, France and
Spain for the resampling process. We set the fraction of sample graph nodes δ from 70.0%
to 90.0%. The following steps are used to simulate the rejection rate of the proposed test
procedure based on network resampling:
Step 1: The 1st sample sub-network, denoted as G01 is obtained from network G1 by BFS with
fraction 100δ%.
Step 2: The 2nd sample sub-network G002 is obtained from G2 by BFS with fraction 100δ%.
Step 3: Perform the likelihood ratio test presented in Section 2.3.1 based on the simulated data
and obtain the p-value.
Step 4: Repeat Step 1 to Step 3 N times. The simulated rejection rate is # {p-value < 0.05}/N .
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G0

G00

Fraction of nodes
70%

72%

74%

76%

78%

0

80%

82%

84%

86%

88%

90%

00

Subgraphs G and G sample by BFS from same graph
G0G
G0F
G0S

G00G
G00F
G00S

0.240

0.197

0.083

0.007

0.007

<0.001

0.001

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

0.015

0.012

0.003

0.005

0.024

0.042

0.031

0.014

0.029

0.047

0.025

0.067

0.036

0.046

0.031

0.050

0.016

<0.001

0.062

<0.001

0.031

<0.001

0

00

Subgraphs G and G sample by BFS from different graphs
G0G
G0G
G0F

G00F
G00S
G00S

0.719

0.743

0.711

0.661

0.721

0.768

0.813

0.665

0.760

0.925

0.948

0.949

0.948

0.908

0.929

0.951

0.926

0.930

0.948

0.951

0.974

0.979

0.141

0.153

0.235

0.173

0.195

0.265

0.159

0.163

0.166

0.244

0.243

Table 2.7: Simulated rejection rates between two sub-graphs under BFS sampling with
fraction f from the power grid networks of Germany, France and Spain.

The simulation rejection rates between two sub-graphs under BFS sampling with different
fractions δ for testing the hypotheses is H0 : R(G0i ) = R(G00i ) versus H1 : R(G0i ) 6= R(G00i ),
where sub-graphs G0i and G00i sampled from the graph (GG : Germany; GF : France; GS :
Spain) based on 10000 simulations are presented in Table 2.7. In Table 2.7, the upper part
of table shows the simulated rejection rates between two sub-graphs resampled from the same
power grid with different fractions. We find that the corresponding rejection rates in the
three scenarios (i.e., G0G versus G00G , G0F versus G00F , and G0S versus G00S ) become closer to 0.05
as the fraction δ increases. Most of these rejection rates are below the nominal level 0.05,
which indicate that the proposed model and testing procedure work as expected. The lower
part of Table 2.7 presents the simulated rejection rates between two sub-graphs resampled
from two different power grid networks which are difference in terms of robustness based
on the results in Section 2.4. In contrast, the lower part of table has substantially higher
rejection rates compared to the upper part of Table 2.7. The results from these analyses
demonstrate that the proposed model and testing procedures provide reasonable power in
detecting the difference between two networks in terms of robustness.
To detect the sensitive of the proposed gamma degradation model, we use the simulated
datasets generated from Wiener process model (please see Appendix A.4 for details).
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CHAPTER 3
Statistical Models and Algorithms for Assessing Robustness and Reliability of Networks
with Applications in Cybersecurity Insurance

Modern cyber systems and computer infrastructure for commerce and communications
such as cyberspace, the Internet, electronic payment systems, and file-sharing systems can
be represented as complex networks. Cybersecurity insurance is one of the possible ways to
manage risk exposure for these complex cyber networks. For the pricing of cybersecurity
insurance, comprehending the loss of availability of a cyber or physical network subject to
attacks or failures and assessing the risks of a complex network is of great interest. To
understand the risk of complex networks, we propose a modified Wiener process model for
the degeneration of the network functionality upon the removal of nodes due to attacks
or malfunctions. We also propose three statistical testing procedures based on the Wiener
process model to compare the risk and resilience of two different networks, which can be used
to comparing risks in the cybersecurity insurance domain. The proposed methodologies can
be applied to any topological measures of network robustness or risk. Practical data analysis
for the peer-to-peer file-sharing networks is presented to illustrate the proposed model and
methods. Monte Carlo simulations are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed
methodologies and practical recommendations are provided.

3.1. Introduction

Many complex networks, such as cyberspace, the Internet, power grids, are critical infrastructures for commerce and communications that require extremely high reliability and
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safety standard. Significant attacks or failures on those complex networks could cause serious damage to society. Insurance is one of the possible ways to manage risk exposure for
these complex networks. For example, cybersecurity insurance is designed to mitigate losses
from a variety of cyber incidents, including data breaches, business interruption, and network damage [29]. In 2013, the Group of Twenty (G-20) urged to treat cyber-attacks as a
threat to the global economy [3]. For the data and statistics from government, industry, and
information technology related to the current state of cybersecurity threats in the United
States and internationally, one can refer to [104]. Recently, Böhme et al. [15] provided a
general framework for actuaries to think about cyber risk and the approaches to cyber risk
analysis. In this chapter, “cyberspace” refers to the interactive domain composed of all digital networks used to store, modify, and communicate information, and the term “cyber risk"
refers to a multitude of different sources of risk affecting the information and technology
assets of a company [12]. Since the internet is one of the most complex systems humanity
has ever devised, cyber risk management becomes a prominent issue for society, especially
for insurance companies [132]. However, research on cyber risk, especially on evaluation and
comparison of the risks in the insurance domain, is fairly limited. In addition, pricing for
cybersecutiry insurance is a challenging problem since sybersecutiry insurance has no standard scoring systems or actuarial tables for rate making [122]. Moreover, there is a lack of
open-source data for organizations’ internal networks for security breaches and losses due to
the disinclination of organizations to disclose details of security breaches. As Böhme et al.
[15] pointed out, understanding cyber risk is a hard problem, therefore, comprehending how
vulnerable is a cyber or physical network to attacks or failures and assessing the risks of a
complex network is of great interest. There is an urgent need to develop advanced methodologies that can systematically assess the risk, robustness, reliability, or loss of availability
of a network and comparing the risk and robustness of different networks.
Cyber risk is a fundamental measurement providing a quantitative measure of the security level, the capability of capturing attacks, and the lost of availability that results in loss
of integrity and availability [12, 15]. To evaluate the loss of availability of cyber networks,
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various heuristic methods were proposed to measure the resilience of cyber networks under
malicious cyber attacks [5, 45]. However, those heuristic methods are often designed for
a specific cyber network, which limited their applicability to diverse areas [55]. In general, metric-based approaches use specific measures of individual properties of cyber system
components to access resilience. For example, when evaluating the resilience of a computer
system, Ganin et al. [38] considered the percentage of computers that are functioning and
the ratio of a system’s actual flow to its maximum capacity for measuring resilience. This
metric-based approach may not be appropriate for systems that the connections between the
nodes (computers) have an important effect on the resilience of the system. Therefore, some
high-order structures and topological measures of a network should be considered.
In managing cyber risk in the insurance domain, different tools and methods have
been proposed for evaluating the network robustness in the past decades, however, algorithms/techniques based on statistical models and stochastic processes have not been broadly
developed. In this chapter, we aim to develop dependable and flexible statistical models and
hypothesis testing procedures to assess the risk and robustness of a complex network which
can provide useful information for cyber insurance providers. Specifically, we propose a
modified Wiener process model with several statistical hypothesis testing procedures for
this purpose. The Wiener process model is one of the widely used stochastic models for
non-monotonic degradation processes which can provide a good description of the system’s
behavior in the cascading failure process [20, 32, 66]. Compared with observing dynamics
of the topological measures under attacks, the proposed modified Wiener process model can
model the evolution of the degradation data in each network topological measure and also
provide great flexibility in degradation modeling, e.g., non-linear degradation mechanisms.
The proposed methodologies will expand the actuarial knowledge on the evaluation and
comparison of risks for different physical and/or cyber networks and cybersecurity insurance
pricing models.
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3.2. Graph Representation of Cyber Network

Inherently, a cyber network, such as the P2P cyber network, can be viewed as a graph
structure consisting of nodes and edges. For example, in a P2P cyber network, the hosts are
considered as nodes in a graph, and the host’s neighbor set is described by the set of edges
in a graph. A graph structure can be represented as G = {V, E, W }, where V is a node set
with cardinality (the number of elements in a set) |V| of N , E ⊆ V × V is an edge set, and
W is the adjacency matrix of G, which is an N × N nonnegative symmetric matrix with
entries {ωij }1≤i,j≤N , i.e., ωij 6= 0 for any eij ∈ E and ωij = 0, otherwise. In the study of
cyber network, we consider unweighted and undirected graph, i.e., ωij = 1 and eij = eji ∈ E,
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Hence, we suppress the notation of the adjacency matrix in the graph
representation and represent the graph as G = {V, E}.
To evaluate the robustness/loss of availability of a network, the decrease of network
performance due to a selected removal of nodes or edges is considered. For example, in
cyberspace, computers and hand-held devices are connected to servers over active Internet
signals or local area network (LAN) lines. In this case, those computers, hand-held devices,
and servers are the nodes and the LAN lines and Internet signals are edges of the network
graph of interest. The failure of a server or broken LAN lines (due to physical or cyber
attacks, or human errors) will reduce the functionality of the cyber network.
High-order structures are often called the building blocks of network [68]. Compared
with global network topology (e.g., graph diameter and average path length) [23, 26, 84],
through studying the high-order structures, we can capture more local information of network
structure. For instance, feedforward loops have proven fundamental to understanding the
mechanism of transcriptional regulation networks [99]. Here, the robustness of a cyber
network can be defined as the ability of a network to maintain its functionality/connectivity
when it is subject to failure or attack. There is a variety of graph measures that provide
robustness measures on a network [77]. For example, vertex connectivity is defined as the
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minimum number of vertices that need to be removed to disconnect the graph and the average
cluster coefficient that represents the probability that neighbors of a node are also connected
[48, 117]. Another commonly used robustness measure is the network motifs introduced by
Milo et al. [75] in conjunction with the assessment of the stability of biological networks
and later have been studied in a variety of contexts [6]. Network motifs are subgraphs
(smaller patterns) that the numbers of appearances are statistically significantly greater
than a predefined threshold in a randomized network. A motif here is broadly defined as
a recurrent multi-node subgraph pattern. Formally, a motif is an induced subgraph of G.
Figure 3.1 shows all possible 4-size motifs in undirected graph. Recently, Dey et al. [30]
focused on incorporating network motifs to evaluate and estimate the power system reliability
with the help of statistical models.

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

Figure 3.1: All connected 4-node network motifs.

To obtain the exact motif counts of different motif types in a specific k-size motif in
a network, the RANDESU motif finder algorithm can be used [47] . For large network
(> 10, 000 edges), algorithms to approximate the exact motif counts can be used [15, 54],
which introduces another layer of randomness in the data whereas suitable statistical models
and techniques are required. To assess the robustness of a complex network like the cyber
network, we focus on remaining motif distributions under various attacks like the physical
or cyber-attack and cascading failure of attacks.
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3.3. Wiener Process Model and Similarity Tests for Networks

In this chapter, we assume that either the exact or approximate measures of network
robustness can be obtained and focus on the development of novel statistical algorithms to
assess the robustness and the risk, as well as to compare the risks of different networks.
Although the methods described here focus on network motifs, the proposed methodologies
can be applied to any topological measures of network robustness/risk such as the Wasserstein distance and the weighted-pairwise distance. The process of reducing the functionality
of the physical or cyber networks under removal of nodes and/or edges can be viewed as a
degradation process [20] and hence, novel statistical models and algorithms for degradation
data analysis can be applied to evaluate and compare the risks of different complex networks.
In this section, we investigate how local topological features (e.g., local network structures) evolve under the removal of nodes and/or edges. Our main postulate here is that a
complex system can be considered more resilient if it tends to preserve its original properties
longer under the removal of nodes and/or edges, and our primary focus is to quantify the
risks of different networks through statistical modeling and analyses of the geometric properties of different network systems. A stochastic model, the Wiener process model, along with
several statistical hypothesis testing procedures to compare the risks of different networks
are developed. The mathematical notation and the Wiener process model are introduced
in Section 3.3.1 and three statistical hypothesis testing procedures are proposed in Section
3.3.2.
3.3.1. Wiener process model

Suppose that there are I networks and J different topological features (e.g., network
motifs, Wasserstein distance, and weighted-pairwise distance, etc.) are used to measure the
risks of those I networks, these topological features are observed at different time points tk ,
k = 0, 1, . . . , K, where K +1 is the total number of observation points. The observation point
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tk can be considered as a specific fraction of random/selective nodes (e.g., nodes with the
highest degrees or nodes with the largest betweenness) being removed from the network. We
denote the observed value of the j-th topological feature for network i at the k-th time point
as yi,j,k . For example, consider the 4-node motif M1 in Figure 3.1 as the j-th topological
feature, then yi,j,0 is the number of the 4-node motif M1 in network i when all the nodes and
edges in the network are fully functioning (i.e., at time t0 ), yi,j,1 is the number of the 4-node
motif M1 in network i when 10% of the nodes and edges in the network are removed (say,
at time t1 ), yi,j,2 is the number of the 4-node motif M1 in network i when 20% of the nodes
and edges in the network are removed (say, at time t2 ), and so on.
Since the dynamics of the local topological measures upon removal of the nodes/edges
may not necessarily be a monotonic deterioration process and due to the stochastic nature
of this process, we thus propose using the Wiener process model to characterize the degradation paths of those topological measures of a complex network. We consider modeling the
degeneration process of the functionality of the i-th network based on the j-th topological
∗
.
measure by using a Wiener process with drift parameter µ∗i,j and diffusion coefficient σi,j

Specifically, we consider Di,j (tk ) = 1 − yi,j,k /yi,j,0 as a stochastic process {Di,j (tk ), tk ≥ 0},
which is characterized by the following properties:
(i) Di,j (t0 ) = 1 − yi,j,0 /yi,j,0 = 0;
(ii) {Di,j (tk ), tk ≥ 0} has stable independent increments, i.e., the increments xi,j,k defined
by {Di,j (tk ) − Di,j (tk−1 )}, k = 1, 2, . . . , K are independent;
∗2
(iii) the increments xi,j,k follows a normal distribution N (µ∗i,j , σi,j
).

Since different topological measures may share similar characteristics, therefore, we modify
the Wiener process model by introducing a correlation structure among the J topological
measures. Based on the modified Wiener process model, in our study, we define a J dimensional vector of random variables xi,k = (xi,1,k , xi,2,k , . . . , xi,J ,k )0 ∈ RJ , where xi,j,k =
(yi,j,k − yi,j,k+1 )/yi,j,0 , i = 1, 2, . . . , I; j = 1, 2, . . . , J ; k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , K, and assume that the
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degradation process follows a Wiener process with drift µi and variance-covariance Σi . In
other words, the J -dimensional vector of random variables xi,k = (xi,1,k , xi,2,k , . . . , xi,J ,k )0 ∈
RJ follows a J -dimensional multivariate normal distribution denoted as
MW : xi,k ∼ NJ (µi ∆ti , Σi ∆ti ),

(3.1)

where ∆ti represents the difference between two time points, µi = (µi1 , . . . , µiJ )0 ∈ RJ
represents the slope of the linear drift and Σi represents an J × J symmetric variancecovariance matrix
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(3.2)

σi,J J

which is also known as the diffusion coefficient. It is worth to mention that, in our study,
we assume the attack sequence taken at successive equally spaced points in time, i.e., ∆ti =
ti − ti−1 = ∆t; without loss of generality, we can conisder xi,k ∼ NJ (µi , Σi ). The joint
probability density function of the random vector xi,k is
1
(xi,k − µi )0 Σ−1
i (xi,k − µi )
f (xi,k ; µi , Σi ) =
exp
,
J
/2
1/2
(2π) |Σi |
2
(

)

(3.3)

for xi,k ∈ RJ . Under this setting, the log-likelihood function can be expressed
ln L(θ|x) =

I
X

ln Li (θi |xi ),

(3.4)

i=1

where x = (x1 , . . . , xI ), θ = (θ1 , . . . , θI ),
ln L(θi |xi ) =

J
1
1
− ln (2π) − ln (|Σi |) − (xi,k − µi )0 Σ−1
i (xi,k − µi ) ,
2
2
2

K 
X
k=1
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(3.5)

and θi = {(µi , Σi )|µi ∈ RJ , Σi is an J × J positive-semidefinite matrix} is the parameter vector for the i-th network. The maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the model
parameters can be obtained by maximizing ln L(θi |xi ) in Equation (3.5) with respect to µi
and Σi . Iterative numerical algorithms for solving a non-linear system of equations with
constraints, such as the limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm for
box constraints (L-BFGS-B algorithm), can be utilized here to obtain the MLEs.
3.3.2. Similarity tests for two complex networks

In this subsection, we consider three different statistical procedures for testing the similarity of two complex networks (say, Network 1 and Network 2) in terms of their resilience/risk
level based on the J topological measures. We are interested in testing the hypotheses
H0 :Network 1 and Network 2 have the same resilience/risk level
against H1 :Network 1 and Network 2 do not have the same resilience/risk level

(3.6)

3.3.2.1. A test procedure based on resampling

The first proposed testing procedure is based on the Euclidean distance of degradation curves with resampling approach. Based on the observed degradation measurements
~ 1 = {x1,1 , x1,2 , · · · , x1,K } and x
~ 2 = {x2,1 , x2,2 , · · · , x2,K } from Network 1 and Network 2, rex
spectively, the algorithm to compute the p-value for testing the hypotheses in Equation (3.6)
is described here. We name this procedure as Procedure A.
Step A1: Compute
and

~2
x

the

Euclidean
=

~ 2) =
dobs = dobs (~
x1 , x

distance

between

{x2,1 , x2,2 , · · · , x2,K }
hP

K
k=1

j=1 (x1,k

PJ

− x2,k )2
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i1/2

.

~1
x

=

for

the

{x1,1 , x1,2 , · · · , x1,K }
two

networks:

Step A2: Combine the two sets of observed degradation measurements and denote the combined
~ C = (~
~ 2 ). Based on the Wiener process model in Equation (3.1)
data set as x
x1 , x
~ C)
obtain the MLE of θ = (µ, Σ) by maximizing the log-likelihood function ln L(θ, x
in Equation (3.5) with respect to θ. The MLE of θ based on the combined data set
under H0 in Equation (3.6) is denoted by θ̂C = (µ̂C , Σ̂C ).
(1)

(1)

Step A3: Generate x1,k and x2,k from a J -dimensional multivariate normal distribution
NJ (µ̂C , Σ̂C ),

for

k

=

1, 2, . . . , K,

to

obtain

the

bootstrap

samples

(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
~ (1)
~ (1)
x
2 = {x2,1 , x2,2 , . . . , x2,K }, respectively.
1 = {x1,1 , x1,2 , . . . , x1,K } and x

~ (1)
~ (1)
Step A4: Compute the Euclidean distance between the two bootstrap samples x
1 and x
2 as

(1)

(1)

~2 ) = 
d(1) = d(1) (~
x1 , x

K X
J
X

1/2
(1)

(1)

(x1,k − x2,k )2 

.

k=1 j=1

Step A5: Repeat Steps A3–A4 B times to obtain a sequence of bootstrap Euclidean distances,
(b)

(b)

~ 2 ), for b = 1, 2, . . . , B.
d(b) = d(b) (~
x1 , x
Step A6: The p-value of the test is computed as
pA =

B
1 X
1
(b) ,
B b=1 {dobs >d }

where 1{A} is an indicator function defined as 1{A} = 1 if event A is true and 1{A} = 0
otherwise.

The null hypothesis in Equation (3.6) is rejected if pA < α, where α is a prefixed significant level. Note that Procedure A only uses the Wiener process model in the resampling
process in Steps A3 and A4. In this procedure, we use the Euclidean distance as a measure
of the distance between two vectors, however, other types of distance metrics such as the
Manhattan distance can be used in place of the Euclidean distance.
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3.3.2.2. Test procedures based on likelihood ratio test statistic

Under the Wiener process model described in Section 3.3.1, the hypotheses in Equation (3.6) can be expressed as
H0 :µ1 = µ2 = µ and Σ1 = Σ2 = Σ
against H1 :µ1 6= µ2 or Σ1 6= Σ2 .

(3.7)

~ i)
Let θ̂i = (µ̂i , Σ̂i ) be the MLE of the θi that maximizes the log-likelihood function ln L(θi , x
~ i , i.e.,
in Equation (3.5) with respect to θi based on the data x
~ i ),
θ̂i = arg max ln L(θi , x

(3.8)

θi

~ C = (~
~ 2 ), the MLE of θC =
for i = 1, 2. Similarly, based on the combined data set x
x1 , x
~ C ) in Equation (3.5) with
(µC , ΣC ) that maximizes the log-likelihood function ln L(θC , x
respect to θC under H0 in Equation (3.7) is denoted as θ̂C , i.e.,
~ C ).
θ̂C = arg max ln L(θC , x

(3.9)

θC

~ 1 and x
~ 2 is defined as
The likelihood ratio test statistic based on x
~ C)
L(θ̂C , x
~ 2 ) = −2 ln
Λ(~
x1 , x
.
~ 1 ) × L(θ̂2 , x
~ 2)
L(θ̂1 , x
"

#

(3.10)

The Neyman–Pearson lemma states that the likelihood ratio test is the most powerful test
~ 2 ) is
at significance level α. As the sample size approaches ∞, the test statistic Λ(~
x1 , x
asymptotically chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom q = J + J (J + 1)/2. Two
statistical hypothesis test procedures, namely Procedure B1 and Procedure B2, are developed
here based on the likelihood ratio test statistic in Equation (3.10). The p-value of Procedure
B1 is obtained based on the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio test statistic

50

~ 2 ), while the p-value of Procedure B2 is obtained based on resampling technique.
Λ(~
x1 , x
~ 1 = {x1,1 , x1,2 , · · · , x1,K } and x
~2 =
Based on the observed degradation measurements x
{x2,1 , x2,2 , · · · , x2,K } from Network 1 and Network 2, respectively, the algorithm to computer
the p-value for Procedures B1 and B2 can be described as follows:
~ i , i = 1, 2 based on Equation (3.8).
Step B1: Obtain the MLE of θi = (µi , Σi ) from x
~ C = (~
~ 2 ) and obtain
Step B2: Combine the two sets of observed degradation measurements x
x1 , x
~ C based on Equation (3.9).
the MLE of θC = (µC , ΣC ) from x
~ 2 ) from Equation (3.10).
Step B3: Compute the likelihood ratio test statistic Λobs = Λ(~
x1 , x
Step B4: For Procedure B1, the p-value is computed as
pB1 = Pr(W < Λobs ),
where W is random variable that follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of
freedom q = J + J (J + 1)/2.
(1)

(1)

Step B4’: Generate x1,k and x2,k from a J -dimensional multivariate normal distribution
NJ (µ̂C , Σ̂C ),

for

k

=

1, 2, . . . , K,

to

obtain

the

bootstrap

samples

(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
~ (1)
~ (1)
x
1 = {x1,1 , x1,2 , . . . , x1,K } and x
2 = {x2,1 , x2,2 , . . . , x2,K }, respectively.

Step B5’: Compute the likelihood ratio test statistic based on the two bootstrap samples as
(1)

(1)

~ 2 ) from Equation (3.10).
Λ(1) = Λ(~
x1 , x
Step B6’: Repeat Steps B4’–B5’ B times to obtain a sequence of bootstrap likelihood ratio test
(b)

(b)

~ 2 ), for b = 1, 2, . . . , B.
statistics, Λ(b) = Λ(~
x1 , x
Step B7’: For Procedure B2, the p-value is computed as
pB2 =

B
1 X
1
(b) .
B b=1 {Λobs <Λ }
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The null hypothesis in Equation (3.7) is rejected if pB1 < α for Procedure B1, and if
pB2 < α for Procedure B2, where α is a prefixed significant level.

3.4. Practical Data Analysis

In this section, we illustrate the proposed model and methods by analyzing the real
network datasets for P2P service, which is a kind of cyber system that requires cybersecurity
insurance. The background of the network datasets is presented in Section 3.4.1, and the
results and discussions of the data analysis are presented in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1. Background of the peer-to-peer network datasets

In recent years, digital currency electronic payment has become more popular, and hence,
many countries and companies are committed to strengthening security in digital payments
to gain customer’s confidence. The number of people sending money using P2P payments
was up 116% and the transactions increased by 207% in 2019 compared with the previous
year [85]. P2P networks are also used for sharing electronic files and digital media. Cybersecurity insurance is an indispensable part of the digital currency electronic payment
and file-sharing system, especially for the P2P payments/services [18, 40, 53, 56] and the
blockchain ecosystem which has a large number of clients and servers. Evaluating the reliability of the P2P systems is an important issue for P2P service providers since scammers
can destruct the P2P platform.
Gnutella is an open, decentralized, distributed, P2P search protocol that mainly used
to find files [90]. A P2P system can be considered as a cyber network in which individual
computers connect directly with each other and share information and resources without
using dedicated servers. The nodes in Gnutella perform tasks normally associated with
both servers and clients. The nodes provide the client-side interfaces that users can issue
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queries and accept queries from other users. A synopsis of the network structure of a P2P
system is illustrated in Figure 3.2. For illustrative purposes, in this example, we consider
three snapshots of the Gnutella network collected on August 4, 6, and 9, 2002 from the
Stanford Network Analysis Project (SNAP) [59, 91]. For notation convenience, we denote
the Gnutella networks collected on August 4, 6, and 9, 2002 as P2P network by G1 , G2 , and
G3 , respectively.

Figure 3.2: A synopsis of the network structure of a P2P system [105].

Here, nodes represent hosts in the Gnutella network topology and edges represent connections between the Gnutella hosts. The basic network structure information of the three
Gnutella computer networks are presented in Table 3.1.
Gnutella Computer Network

Collected on

# of nodes

# of edges

G1

August 4, 2002

10,876

39,994

G2

August 6, 2002

8,717

31,525

G3

August 9, 2002

8,114

26,013

Table 3.1: Basic network structure information of the three Gnutella computer networks.

In this example, since P2P networks do not have fixed client and servers and the roles of
peer nodes would be always changed across different days, the nodes (computers) in the P2P
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system are not likely to be the same on the three different dates. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that the P2P network snapshots on August 4, 6, and 9, 2002 are independent
and they are three cyber networks with different structures. We are interested in evaluating
and comparing the risks of these three networks with different structures for the purpose
of determining appropriate cyber insurance policies. For instance, if we find that the three
cyber networks are different in terms of risk and reliability, the cyber insurance premium for
the network with the highest risk should be higher than the others.
3.4.2. Peer-to-peer network similarity analysis under degree-based attack

In this subsection, we apply the proposed Wiener process model and hypothesis testing
procedures to assess and compare the cyber networks presented in Tables 3.1 in terms of the
robustness and the risk of the cyber networks. Here, the 4-node network motifs M1 , M2 ,
and M3 presented in Figure 3.1 are the topological features that can be observed in target
network for measuring the risks of the networks. We remove the nodes in the cyber network
based on the degree sequence of the graph (i.e., degree-based attacks), where the degree of
a node in a graph is the number of edges that are connected to the node. In other words,
the node with the largest degree will get removed first, and the counts of 4-node motifs are
obtained when 1%, 2%, . . . , 10% of the nodes are removed. Figure 3.3 shows the dynamics
of the degradation (in percentages) of the three 4-node motifs under degree-based attacks
with K = 11 observation points (including the initial status).
Following the notation defined in Section 3.3, yi,j,k corresponds to the counts of the 4node motif Mj (j = 1, 2, 3) when k% (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 10) of the nodes are removed based on
degree-based attack in cyber network Gi (i = 1, 2, 3), and xi,k = (xi,1,k , xi,2,k , xi,3,k )0 ∈ R3 is a
three-dimensional vector of random variables, where xi,j,k = (yi,j,k − yi,j,k+1 )/yi,j,0 , i = 1, 2, 3;
j = 1, 2, 3; k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 10 is assume to follow a trivariate normal distribution with mean
vector µi and variance-covariance Σi .
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For the Gnutella computer networks, the MLEs of the drift parameter µi = (µi1 , µi2 , µi3 )0
and the diffusion coefficient Σi = (σi,jj 0 )j,j 0 =1,2,3 for network Gi , i = 1, 2, 3 under degreebased attack are presented in Table 3.2, where j, j 0 = 1, 2, 3 corresponding to the three
4-node motifs M1 , M2 , and M3 , respectively. The observed values of the test statistics and
the corresponding p-values based on Procedures A, B1 and B2 for the pairwise comparisons
of the networks {G1 , G2 , G3 } are presented in Tables 3.3. The number of bootstrap samples
used in Procedure A and Procedure B2 is B = 500.
3.4.3. Experiments on peer-to-peer networks

Considering statistical significance at 5% level and compensating for multiple comparisons by using the Bonferroni correction [16], the p-values presented in Table 3.3 that are
smaller than 0.05/3 ≈ 0.01667 are highlighted in bold to indicate the cases that the null
hypothesis in Equation (3.6) is rejected. From Table 3.3, we can see that all the three proposed testing procedures (Procedures A, B1, and B2) show that networks G1 and G3 are
different in the resilience/risk levels, while networks G1 and G2 have no significant difference
in the resilience/risk levels at the overall 5% significance level. For the comparison between
networks G1 and G2 , although the p-value obtained from Procedure A is greater than the
adjusted nominal significance level 0.01667, the small p-values from the three test procedures
suggests that networks G1 and G2 are different in terms of the resilience/risk levels.
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Figure 3.3: The dynamics of the degradation (in percentages) of the three 4-node motifs of
the three networks G1 , G2 , and G3 under degree-based attacks with K = 11 observation
points.

µ̂ = (µ̂1 , µ̂2 , µ̂3 )0
Network

µ̂1

µ̂2

µ̂3

Σ̂
h 0.0388 0.0118 0.0128 i

G1

0.2415

0.2153

0.2603

G2

0.2660

0.2247

0.3408

G3

0.3497

0.2881

0.4915

0.0144 0.0078

h 0.0966 0.0278 0.0171
i
0.0690
0.0320 0.0397

h 0.3395 0.1045 0.1971
i
0.2697
0.1288 0.1661
0.8570

Table 3.2: Maximum likelihood estimates of the drift parameters and the diffusion
coefficient in the Wiener process model for G1 , G2 , and G3 under degree-based attack.

Test

dobs

Λobs

Procedure A

Procedure B1

Procedure B2

G1 vs. G2

1.1122

16.1882

0.0235

0.0127

0.0102

G1 vs. G3

2.8482

44.6146

< 0.001

< 0.001

< 0.001

G2 vs. G3

1.7662

12.1299

0.0682

0.0591

0.0553

Table 3.3: The observed values of the test statistics and the corresponding p-values based
on Procedures A, B1 and B2 for the pairwise comparisons of the three networks G1 , G2 ,
and G3 .

From the estimates of the drift parameters presented in Table 3.2, we observe that µ̂3j >
µ̂2j > µ̂1j for j = 1, 2, 3, which indicates that the functionality of network G1 drops slower
than networks G2 and network G3 subject to the degree-based attacks. In other words, the
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smaller the values of µ̂ij , the more robust (smaller the risk of) the P2P network. Thus, the
results of the analysis based on the proposed methodologies suggest that network G1 is the
most reliable network among the three networks while networks G2 and G3 have similar risk
levels. These conclusions agree with the observations obtained by looking at the graphs in
Figure 3.3.
In this example, we can see that the proposed methodologies can qualify and compare the
risks of different complex networks by using the p-values of the hypothesis testing procedures
as p-value is in (0, 1), and the model parameter estimates. This information can be used in
determining the premium of cybersecurity insurance. For example, based on the results in
this example, the cybersecurity insurance premium for network G1 should be lower than the
premiums for networks G2 and G3 .

3.5. Monte Carlo Simulation Studies

In this section, Monte Carlo simulation studies are used to verify the usefulness of the
proposed Wiener process model and testing procedures for the similarity of two complex
networks in terms of the resilience/risk level. We conduct (i) a simulation study based on a
parametric statistical model in Section 3.5.1 and (ii) a simulation study without relying on
generating data from a parametric model in Section 3.5.2. In these simulation studies, we
compare the performance of the three proposed testing procedures, Procedure A, Procedure
B1, and Procedure B2, for assessing the similarity of different complex networks based on
the simulated type-I error rates and the simulated power values.
3.5.1. Network data generated from a parametric statistical model

In order to evaluate and validate the effectiveness of the proposed methodologies, we
consider a simulation study in which the network data are generated based on the Wiener
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process model in Equation (3.1). In this simulation, we assume that there are three different
topological features for measuring the risks of two cyber-networks (i.e., J = 3 and I = 2)
and these three topological features are observed at K = 11 time points. We are interested
in testing the hypotheses in Equation (3.6). The topological features for Network 1 and
Network 2 in Equation (3.6) are simulated from the Wiener process model in Equation (3.1)
with the following parameter settings based on the networks G1 and G2 in the numerical
example presented in Section 3.4:
• Network 1:


1(a) θ1 = (µ1 , Σ1 ) µ1 =





0.2660








0.2247









and Σ1 =

0.3408



1(b) θ1 = (µ1 , Σ1 ) µ1 =

0.0118 0.0128

0.0144

and Σ1 =

0.2603

0.0966













;
0.0078





0.0171







0.2415








0.2153









0.0388












0.0278 0.0690

0.0320




.
0.0397





0.1971

• Network 2:
2(a) θ2 = (a × µ1 , Σ1 ), where a = {0.05, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0, 4.0};
2(b) θ2 = (µ1 , a × Σ1 ), where a = {0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.05, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0, 4.0};
2(c) θ2 = (a0 + µ1 , Σ1 ), where a0 = {0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}.
For each combination of the settings for Network 1 and Network 2, we simulated 1,000
sets of experiments and applied the three proposed testing procedures. The number of
bootstrap samples used in Procedure A and Procedure B2 is B = 500. Considering using
5% significance level, the simulated proportions of the p-values less than 0.05 (i.e., rejecting
the null hypothesis in Equation (3.6) at 5% level of significance) are presented in Table
3.4. Note that when a = 1.0 and a0 = 0.0, the proportions of the p-values less than 0.05
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are corresponding to the simulated type-I error rates and when a 6= 1.0 or a0 6= 0.0, the
proportions of the p-values less than 0.05 are corresponding to the simulated power values.
From the simulation results in Tables 3.4, we observe that the simulated type-I error
rates (i.e., the simulation rejection rates when a = 1.0 or a0 = 0.0) for Procedure A are
always controlled under the nominal 5% level for all the settings considered here, while the
simulated type-I error rates for Procedures B1 and B2 can be higher than the nominal 5%
level. Especially for setting 1(a), Procedure B1 has the simulated type-I error rate of 0.072.
For the power of the three proposed procedures, we observe that the power values increases
when the simulated settings are further away from the null hypothesis that Network 1 and
Network 2 have the same resilience/risk level, i.e., when a increases from 1.0 to 4.0 or a
decreases from 1.0 to 0.05, or a0 increases from 0.0 to 0.20. These simulation results indicate
that the proposed testing procedures can effectively detect the difference in resilience/risk
levels between two complex networks. Although Procedure B1 gives larger power values
compare to Procedures A and B2 in most cases, it may be due to the inflated type-I error
rate. In comparing the power values of Procedures A and B2, the power values of these two
procedures are similar, therefore, when taking the ability in controlling type-I error rate, we
would recommend using Procedure A based on the simulation results.
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Network 1

1(a)

1(b)

Procedure

Procedure

Network 2

a/a

A

B1

B2

A

B1

B2

2(a): θ2 = (a × µ̂1 , Σ̂1 )

0.05

0.310

0.417

0.306

0.357

0.384

0.358

0.20

0.160

0.183

0.155

0.168

0.170

0.165

0.40

0.122

0.166

0.136

0.125

0.130

0.121

0.60

0.082

0.120

0.105

0.081

0.095

0.079

0.80

0.055

0.076

0.063

0.060

0.075

0.062

1.00

0.046

0.072

0.055

0.047

0.046

0.051

1.20

0.058

0.094

0.059

0.119

0.150

0.123

1.40

0.068

0.126

0.072

0.231

0.240

0.228

1.60

0.112

0.208

0.131

0.277

0.325

0.280

1.80

0.148

0.270

0.150

0.308

0.375

0.316

2.00

0.272

0.366

0.233

0.490

0.510

0.479

4.00

0.999

0.999

0.998

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.05

0.750

0.798

0.757

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.20

0.699

0.734

0.710

0.827

0.858

0.833

0.40

0.231

0.434

0.240

0.201

0.410

0.218

0.60

0.097

0.196

0.100

0.147

0.240

0.156

0.80

0.050

0.116

0.061

0.107

0.150

0.101

1.00

0.046

0.072

0.055

0.047

0.046

0.051

1.20

0.045

0.094

0.066

0.130

0.180

0.147

1.40

0.066

0.124

0.079

0.147

0.194

0.151

1.60

0.098

0.176

0.121

0.179

0.250

0.209

1.80

0.155

0.268

0.180

0.269

0.366

0.299

2.00

0.161

0.282

0.194

0.283

0.378

0.316

4.00

0.716

0.802

0.711

0.753

0.770

0.766

0.00

0.046

0.072

0.055

0.047

0.046

0.051

0.05

0.080

0.142

0.110

0.115

0.135

0.113

0.10

0.249

0.316

0.273

0.238

0.264

0.220

0.15

0.416

0.438

0.371

0.293

0.336

0.288

0.20

0.498

0.546

0.515

0.409

0.457

0.432

2(b): θ2 = (µ̂1 , a × Σ̂1 )

2(c): θ2 = (a0 + µ̂1 , Σ̂1 )

0

Table 3.4: Simulated rejection rates for network data generated from the Wiener process
model.
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3.5.2. Network data generated from nonparametric resampling of a real network dataset

To evaluate the performance of the proposed model and test procedures when the network
data are not simulated from a parametric model, we conduct a simulation study based on
resampling the real Gnutella P2P network data set presented in Section 3.4. Based on the
analysis of Gnutella P2P network data set presented in Section 3.4, we observed that there is a
significant difference between networks G1 and G3 (i.e., the Gnutella P2P network snapshots
on August 4 and 9, 2002, respectively). Therefore, we consider obtaining the simulated
networks by resampling from networks G1 and G3 using the breadth-first search (BFS)
method [24] as the network sampling approach. The BFS method is known as an important
traversing algorithm with many graph-processing applications and has low computational
complexity. After deciding the starting target node arbitrarily, the BFS algorithm traverses
the graph layerwise in a tree by exploring all of the neighbor nodes at the same layer before
moving on to the nodes at a deeper layer until the required number of nodes is reached.
In our study, we terminate the graph traversal procedure when we achieved 100τ % nodes,
where τ ∈ {0.50, 0.55, . . . , 0.70}. Once again, we are interested in testing the hypotheses in
Equation (3.6). Network 1 and Network 2 in Equation (3.6) are simulated by resampling the
100τ % of nodes as follows:
• Network 1: G1 ; Network 2: G1 ;
• Network 1: G3 ; Network 2: G3 ;
• Network 1: G1 ; Network 2: G3 .
The simulated rejection rates between two subgraphs under BFS sampling with 100τ % nodes,
where τ ∈ {0.50, 0.55, . . . , 0.70}, are presented in Table 3.5.

61

% of nodes being resampled
Procedure

Network 1

Network 2

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

A

G1

G1

0.202

0.164

0.075

0.043

0.001

G3

G3

0.152

0.100

0.066

0.040

0.002

G1

G3

0.901

0.950

0.963

0.971

0.999

G1

G1

0.220

0.170

0.081

0.056

0.031

G3

G3

0.189

0.129

0.058

0.052

0.029

G1

G3

0.915

0.967

0.978

0.989

0.999

G1

G1

0.198

0.165

0.069

0.052

0.035

G3

G3

0.190

0.133

0.070

0.053

0.032

G1

G3

0.910

0.961

0.969

0.983

0.999

B1

B2

Table 3.5: Simulated rejection rates between two subgraphs under BFS sampling with 100τ %
nodes, where τ ∈ {0.50, 0.55, . . . , 0.70} from the P2P networks G1 and G3 .

From the simulation results in Table 3.5, we observe that when Network 1 and Network
2 are resampled from G1 and G3 , respectively, the three proposed test procedures reject the
null hypothesis in Equation (3.6) more than 90% of times for all the percentages of nodes
being resampled considered here. Moreover, the simulated rejection rates increase when the
percentage of nodes being resampled increases from 50% to 70%. As we observed in the
results presented in Section 3.4, G1 and G3 are different in terms of their resilience/risk
levels. When the two networks are resampled from the same P2P network (i.e., network G1
or network G3 ), we observed that the simulated rejection rates decrease when the percentage
of nodes being resampled increases from 50% to 70%. This agrees with our intuition since the
higher the percentage of the nodes being sampled from the same network, the similarity of
the two sampled subgraphs is increasing. These simulation results indicate that the proposed
testing procedures can effectively detect the difference in resilience/risk levels between two
complex networks even when the two networks are not generated from the proposed Wiener
process model.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation, we develop the statistical models and methods for assessing the
resilience of complex systems and networks via network theory and Markov models. On
one hand, to describe the higher-order connectivity patterns, we consider network motifs
that unveil hidden mechanisms behind the complex systems. On the other hand, using
network motifs, we show that the proposed modified gamma process model and modified
Wiener process model can effectively distinguish the resilience levels of complex systems
under various types of intentional attacks. Different from the recently proposed stochastic
models in [88, 109], which focus on the global degradation signals, our proposed models are
able to capture the dynamic local information of complex systems and networks. Extensive
experiments on synthetic and real datasets show that our motif-based stochastic models can
evaluate the dynamics of network motifs and classify the fragility of complex networks under
different types of attacks. For future work, integrating higher-order topological signatures
into the proposed modified stochastic models and expanding the study to the design of a
knowledge-based system for strategic planning are possible directions.

4.1. Understanding Power Grid Network Vulnerability through the Stochastic
Lens of Network Motif Evolution

In Chapter 2, we have developed a gamma degradation modeling approach to assess the
reliability and robustness of modern complex networks, with a primary focus on power grid
networks. In contrast to other currently available approaches, one of the key advantages of
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the proposed methodology is that this approach accounts for multiple network topological
metrics. We have primarily focused on network motifs as the descriptors of network topology under hazardous scenarios. We have illustrated utility of the new tools in application
to the vulnerability analysis of European power grid networks. In addition, to illustrate the
performance and utility of the proposed methodology under uncertainties, we performed extensive Monte Carlo simulation studies based on parametric models and resampling of power
grid networks. Although our primary application is on power grids, the proposed framework
can be applied in a conjunction with analysis of functionality, organization, and vulnerability of many other complex networks and systems (e.g., blockchain transaction graphs,
transportation, and telecommunication systems). Furthermore, while we have considered
network motifs as the primary descriptors of the underlying network topology and associated system reliability, our approach can be advanced to incorporate other indicators of
network vulnerability based on global network topology such as average path length, giant
component, and clustering coefficient [1, 25, 81], and local topological descriptors such as
Betti numbers and persistent diagrams [79].
For future research, we can consider advancing the proposed motif-based reliability
framework to model the resilience of multi-layer networks such as critical infrastructures,
blockchain Ethereum token networks, and cryptocurrency-fiat currency interactions.

4.2. Statistical Models and Algorithms for Assessing Robustness and Reliability
of Networks with Applications in Cybersecurity Insurance

In Chapter 3, to comprehend the vulnerability of a cyber or physical network subject to
attacks or failures and to assess the risks of a complex network, we proposed a statistical
approach to assess and understand cyber risk. Specifically, we proposed a Wiener process
model to model the dynamics of the topological measures of the network under attacks or
failures.
64

To illustrate the utility of the proposed model and testing procedures, we conducted
experiments based on the Gnutella P2P cyber network. Network motifs, which can capture
local topological information of a network, are considered as the topological measure in the
example. The proposed methodologies can be applied to different topological measures that
can reflect the functionality of the complex network. In the practical data analysis, we observe that the proposed methodologies can qualify and compare the risks of different complex
networks. We further studied the validity of the proposed methodologies by using two Monte
Carlo simulation studies in which the network data are generated from the proposed Wiener
process model and resampling from the real Gnutella P2P cyber network data, respectively.
From the simulation results, we observed that the proposed testing procedures can effectively
detect the difference in resilience/risk levels between two complex networks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that evaluating the resilience or
robustness of cyber networks by using a stochastic model with statistical hypothesis testing
procedures. The results obtained from the proposed statistical methodologies can provide
some important insights to manage and compare the risks of cyber networks and help cybersecurity insurance providers to determine insurance policy and insurance premiums. The
computer program to execute the proposed methodologies is conducted by R [87].
For future research, we plan to utilize other global network topologies, such as betweenness centrality (BC), graph diameter (D), and average path length (APL), to qualify cyber
network resiliency and apply the proposed method to internal networks. In addition, the
studies presented in this thesis focus on the connectivity of a network, we can further consider using node’s information (e.g., server or customer in P2P system) in quantifying the
risk of a network.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX of CHAPTER 2

A.1. Existence and Uniqueness of the Maximum Likelihood Estimators

According to [69], to show the existence and uniqueness of MLEs of the proposed gamma
degradation model, we need to prove that the log-likelihood function l(θ) is constant on
the boundary of the parameter space and the Hessian matrix, i.e., H(θ) = ∂ 2 l(θ)/∂θi ∂θj0 is
negative-definite everywhere. Based on the functions presented in Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) in
the main body, the log-likelihood function for the i-th network can be expressed as
li (θi ) =

J 
X

− K ln (Γ(λi,j )) − Kλi,j ln (βi ) + (λi,j − 1)

j=1

= −K

K
X

ln (yi,j,k ) −

PK

k=1

k=1
J
X

ln (Γ(λi,j )) − K ln (βi )

j=1

J
X

λi,j +

j=1

J
X

(λi,j − 1)

j=1

K
X

ln (yi,j,k ) −

yi,j,k



βi
PJ

j=1

k=1

PK

k=1

β1

yi,j,k

.

Differentiating li (θi ) with respect to λi,j and βi , we obtain the first derivatives
K
X
∂li (θi )
= −Kψ(λi,j ) − K ln (βi ) +
ln (yi,j,k ),
∂λi,j
k=1

K
∂li (θi )
=−
∂βi

PJ

j=1

βi

λi,j

+
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PJ

j=1

PK

k=1
βi2

yi,j,k

,

(A.1)
(A.2)

where ψ(x) = Γ0 (x)/Γ(x) is the digamma function. Then, we can obtain the second derivatives
∂ 2 li (θi )
= −Kψ1 (λi,j ),
∂λ2i,j
∂ 2 li (θi )
= 0,
∂λi,j ∂λi,j 0
P
P
P
K Jj=1 λi,j
2 Jj=1 K
∂ 2 li (θi )
k=1 yi,j,k
=
−
,
2
2
3
βi
∂βi
βi
K
∂ 2 l1 (θi )
=− ,
∂βi ∂λi,j
βi
where ψ1 (x) =

dψ(x)
dx

(A.3)
(A.4)
(A.5)
(A.6)

∈ R+ is the trigamma function.

In our study, θi represents the parameter vector of i-th power grid network, where θi =
(λi,1 , . . . , λi,J , βi )> . Here, we show that (i) the log-likelihood function is a constant on the
n

boundary and (ii) the Hessian matrix

∂2
l(θi )
∂θa ∂θb

o

is negative definite at every point θi ,

where θa , θb ∈ {λi,1 , . . . , λi,J , βi }.
(i) Constancy on the Boundary:

lim

sup

li (θi ) → −∞.

λi,j →∞ max(y

i,j,k )≤βi

Proof : Since yi,j,k = ln (xi,j,k /xi,j,k+1 ) ∈ (0, 1); Γ(λi,j ) ≥ 1; λi,j > 0 and βi > 0, from
Equation (A.1), we can get the first term −K
PJ PK

−

j=1

y
k=1 i,j,k

βi

PJ

j=1

ln (Γ(λi,j )) < 0 and the fourth term

< 0.

For the second and third terms, we have

−K ln (βi )
= −K ln (β1 )

J
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ln (yi,j,k )

j=1 k=1

k=1
J X
K
X

J X
K
X

ln (yi,j,k ).

(A.7)

Therefore, if max(yi,j,k ) ≤ βi , then Eq. (A.7) < 0, and

lim

sup

λi,j →∞ max(y

li (θi ) → −∞.

i,j,k )≤βi

Similarly, we can show that lim sup l1 (θi ) → −∞.
βi →∞ λi,j >0

Note that since the likelihood function of the modified gamma degradation model includes
logarithm (i.e., yi,j,k = log(xi,j,k /xi,j,k+1 ) and xi,j,k ≥ xi,j,k+1 ), thus yi,j,k ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) Negative-Definiteness of Hessian Matrix: The Hessian matrix H(θi ) ∈ R(J +1)×(J +1)
of the parameter vector (i.e., θi ) of i-th power grid network is given by




H(θi ) =

−Kψ1 (λi,1 )





0




..

.




K

− βi

0

− βKi

···

−Kψ1 (λi,2 ) · · ·
..
.

...

− βKi

···

K

PJ
j=1

∂βi2

λi,j






K

− βi




..

.



PJ PK

2 j=1
y
i,j,k
k=1

−

(A.8)

βi3

From Eqs. (A.3), (A.4), (A.5), and (A.6), we can find that the m-th order leading principal
minor1 of the matrix has sign (−1)m , i.e., the determinant of the upper left 1-by-1 corner
of H(θi ) is negative (−Kψ1 (λ1,1 )), the determinant of the upper left 2-by-2 corner of H(θi )
is positive (K2 ψ1 (λ1,1 )ψ1 (λ1,2 )), the determinant of the upper left 3-by-3 corner of H(θi ) is
negative (−K3 ψ1 (λ1,1 )ψ1 (λ1,2 )ψ1 (λ1,3 )), etc. The corresponding Hessian matrix is negativedefinite everywhere.
For the parameter vector θ

=

(θ1 , . . . , θI ), the Hassian matrix, H(θ)

=

(H(θ1 ), H(θ2 ), . . . , H(θI )), which can be thought of as an array of I Hessian matrices.
Since each Hessian matrix H(θi ) is negative-definite, thus the array of Hessian matrices is
negative-definite.
1

The leading principal submatrix of order m of an n×n matrix is obtained by deleting the last n−m rows
and column of the matrix; the determinant of a leading principal submatrix is called the leading principal
minor of the matrix
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Hence, the existence and uniqueness of the MLE of parameters λ1,j (where j = 1, · · · , J )
and β1 of network 1 for log-likelihood function is guaranteed.

A.2.

Comparison to the Conventional Vulnerability Metrics for Power Grid

Networks
There generally exist two main directions in the analysis of power grid vulnerability,
namely, graph-theoretic tools based on the underlying topology of the power grid network
and hybrid tools which incorporate important power flow information into resilience and
reliability quantification [2, 26, 51, 95]. As noted by Abedi et al. [2], Cuadra et al. [26], and
Sharifi and Yamagata [98], neither of these two approaches can be considered as a preferred
technique but rather these two methods should be viewed as complementary directions.
A.2.1. Graph-theoretic metrics

To better place the proposed new technique within the context of the existing vulnerability measures, we compare the utility of these graph-theoretic vulnerability metrics (see Section 1.3) in comparison to the proposed new gamma degradation model.
First, according to the values of APL, D, and BC for all power grids, we find (1) Romania
can be classified as the most robust power grid (i.e., Romania has the lowest APL, D, and
BC, respectively); (2) both France and Germany have higher APL, higher D, and higher
BC, which suggests that they shall be classified as fragile. Second, based on CC, we find
(1) Spain is the most resilient power grid which achieves the highest CC and Romania with
the lowest CC shall be classified as the most fragile one; (2) CC of France, Germany, Italy,
and Poland are equal/close, which suggests that these four power grids have similar levels of
resilience. Third, based on fc , Spain with the highest fc can be viewed as the most resilient
one and France can be also classified as the next most resilient power grid. Fourth, we
evaluate robustness of the power grid using the vulnerability metric γ of [92], who suggest
that a power grid is robust if γ < 1.5 and fragile otherwise. As Table A.1 shows, [Italy
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> Germany > Romania > Poland > France > Spain]. However, the fragility parameter γ
cannot assist in further discrimination among power grid vulnerability levels. In total, these
contradictory findings suggest that the existing graph-theoretic vulnerability metrics based
on lower order network connectivity might be insufficient to classify power grid resiliency.
To enhance our understanding of the key mechanisms behind fragility of the power grids, a
deeper insight into higher-order structures (e.g., network motifs) or electricity-based metrics
(e.g., power flow) is needed.
Country

APL

D

CC

BC

fc

γ

France

9.59

26

0.08

2750.01

0.66

2.16

Germany

11.75

30

0.07

2235.80

0.58

1.32

Italy

9.74

28

0.08

981.85

0.61

1.21

Poland

6.94

16

0.07

478.38

0.60

1.64

Romania

5.52

11

0.05

237.37

0.59

1.42

Spain

8.26

18

0.09

1670.02

0.70

2.22

Table A.1: Network-based vulnerability metrics for the European power grid networks.

A.2.2. Higher-order structures and electricity-based metrics

We thus compare the robustness of power systems with respect to either network motifs
or power flow information [60, 102, 131]. Since the European power grid networks used above
only contain the graph structural information, to compare with the state-of-the-art (SOTA)
power system reliability metrics, we now consider ACTIVSg500 and ACTIVSg2000 power
systems [123, 124] and examine loss-of-load probability (LOLP) and expected unserved energy (EUE) [67, 71] based on an optimal power flow (OPF) model [60]. The basic components
of are ACTIVSg500 and ACTIVSg2000 power systems listed in Table A.10, Appendix A.6.
Note that LOLP indicates the probability of the occurrence of a loss-of-load event during a
given period, and EUE is used to measure the unserved energy in absolute megawatt hours
or in fractions of total load. By solving the OPF model [60], we calculate mean LOLP and
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mean EUE for both the ACTIVSg500 and ACTIVSg2000 power systems under degree-based
attacks. Table A.2 displays the dynamics of 4-node motifs, mean LOLP, and mean EUE
under degree-based target attacks for ACTIVSg500 and ACTIVSg2000 power systems respectively, where the fraction of nodes removed ∈ {10%, 20%, . . . , 100%}. We also provide
the average degradation rates (Ā) of our proposed degradation model for ACTIVSg500 and
ACTIVSg2000 power systems for (1) observed four types of 4-node motifs (M1 , M2 , M3 ,
and M4 ) and (2) mean LOLP and mean EUE. As demonstrated by the Ā row in Table A.2
(see highlighted parts), we find that the ACTIVSg500 power system is more robust than the
ACTIVSg2000 power system, since the average degradation rates of ACTIVSg500 are always
smaller than the average degradation rates of ACTIVSg2000 in terms of both network motifs
and SOTA reliability metrics. This means that robustness analysis based on network motifs
can yield a similar conclusion as reliability metrics. There are advantages of our proposed
gamma degradation model: (1) our model has lower complexity (whose complexity depends
on the structure of the graph) when the size of power grid is larger and (2) motif information
can be used as alternative local metrics of fragility under various attacks as well as early
warning indicators of system degradation and failure.
We find that both approaches (i.e., based on either network motifs or power flow information) lead to the same conclusion. However, the new motif-based gamma degradation
model uses noticeably less information than the competing measure based on power flow
properties. As a result, the new motif-based gamma degradation model can be used for
such important problems as forecasting power system response to contingencies under limited data and uncertain scenarios. That is, motif characteristics can be further used as local
measures of reliability for power systems under attacks.

A.3. Functionality of Power Grid Network under Attacks
In this section, we evaluate how network motifs affect the functionality of power system
under random attacks and how transmission lines removal impact the functionality of power
system.
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Fractionnode

ACTIVSg500

ACTIVSg2000

M1

M2

M3

M4

LOLP

EUE

M1

M2

M3

M4

LOLP

EUE

0.1

114

512

0

5

0.387

0.070

827

4064

19

14

0.781

0.085

0.2

44

253

0

3

0.402

0.090

214

1352

8

4

0.987

0.158

0.3

14

103

0

1

0.474

0.121

82

577

6

1

1.000

0.287

0.4

0

19

0

0

0.549

0.132

23

190

3

1

1.000

0.433

0.5

0

14

0

0

0.764

0.147

0

15

0

0

1.000

0.547

0.6

0

9

0

0

0.869

0.182

0

4

0

0

1.000

0.631

0.7

0

0

0

0

0.915

0.258

0

3

0

0

1.000

0.682

0.8

0

0

0

0

0.978

0.323

0

0

0

0

1.000

0.738

0.9

0

0

0

0

0.996

0.467

0

0

0

0

1.000

0.748

1.0

0

0

0

0

1.000

0.558

0

0

0

0

1.000

0.758

Ā

1.141

1.126

0.956

0.314

Table A.2: Dynamics of motifs remaining, mean LOLP (LOLP), and mean EUE (EUE) for
ACTIVSg500 and ACTIVSg2000 power systems under degree-based attacks, respectively;
the average degradation rate Ā for ACTIVSg500 and ACTIVSg2000 power systems based
on (1) 4-node motifs, (2) LOLP and EUE.
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A.3.1. Relations between Network Motifs and Functionality of Power System

To illustrate how the power flow, load served, and generators operating are related to
the number of remaining 4-node motifs under random attacks, here we analyze the data
based on the IEEE 118-Bus system with 118 nodes and 177 edges (for more detail, see
Table A.10, Appendix A.6). Table A.3 shows how losing network motifs (i.e., observed
4 types of 4-node motifs) would affect functional integrity of the IEEE 118-Bus system
including power flow, the fraction of load served, and the fraction of generators operating,
under the adverse scenario of random node removal. (Here fractions of nodes removed
are ∈ {10%, 20%, . . . , 100%}). Table A.4 reports the correlation coefficients between four
different types of 4-node motifs and these three electrical properties (i.e., power flows, fraction
of load served, and fraction of generators operating). We observe that there exists a strong
correlation between 4-node motifs and three electrical properties. Furthermore, power flow
and fraction of generators operating exhibit a somewhat stronger correlation with 4-node
motifs than the fraction of load served does.
Fractionnode

M1

M2

M3

M4

Power flows

Fractionload served

Fractiongenerators operating

0.1

269

660

114

16

87.43

0.88

0.85

0.2

201

462

82

10

73.50

0.79

0.74

0.3

112

291

45

9

53.57

0.68

0.60

0.4

30

93

12

3

34.76

0.53

0.42

0.5

14

48

3

1

29.06

0.44

0.31

0.6

4

23

3

0

19.95

0.34

0.18

0.7

1

5

1

0

6.15

0.25

0.08

0.8

0

1

0

0

2.59

0.22

0.04

0.9

0

0

0

0

0.00

0.19

0.00

1.0

0

0

0

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

Table A.3: Dynamics of motifs remaining, the fraction of load served, and the fraction of
generators operating for the IEEE 118-Bus system under attacks (fraction of nodes removed).
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Power flow

Fractionload served

Fractiongenerators operating

M1

0.948

0.885

0.925

M2

0.956

0.897

0.935

M3

0.942

0.877

0.917

M4

0.953

0.904

0.943

Table A.4: Correlation coefficients between the remaining 4-node motifs and three electrical
properties (i.e., power flow, fraction of load served, and fraction of generators operating) by
randomly removing nodes.

To show the dynamics of transmission lines when removing a fraction of selective nodes,
we also analyze the statuses of transmission lines of the IEEE 118-Bus system when a
fraction of random nodes are removed randomly. Table A.5 displays the number of available
transmission lines in service and the number of lines that change in the direction of power
flow under random attacks.
Table A.5 indicates that as can be expected, the number of lines in service decreases
as the fraction of nodes removed increases. However, the number of power flow direction
reversals is not monotone, implying that the reversal of power flow directions tend to be less
relevant to the number of removed lines and more relevant to the locations of the removed
lines.
A.3.2. The Impact of Removing Transmission Lines

Since the European power grid networks contain only graph structural information without AC flow, we study the impact of removing transmission lines under random attacks
on the IEEE 118-Bus system. Table A.6 shows how losing network motifs affects the fraction of load served and the fraction of generators operating for the IEEE 118-Bus system,
under the adverse scenario of random line removal. (Here fractions of removed lines are
∈ {10%, 20%, . . . , 100%}). As Table A.7 demonstrates, both fraction of load served and
fraction of generators operating exhibit strong correlation with 4-node motifs.
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Fractionnode

Numberlines in service

Numberpower direction change

0.1

161

9

0.2

131

17

0.3

105

14

0.4

70

13

0.5

50

8

0.6

36

4

0.7

20

3

0.8

10

0

0.9

3

0

1.0

0

0

Table A.5: Number of lines in service and number of lines which power flow direction is
impacted by random attacks.

Fractionline

M1

M2

M3

M4

Fractionload served

Fractiongenerators operating

0.1

364

840

127

19

0.96

0.96

0.2

260

631

108

15

0.87

0.87

0.3

202

493

88

10

0.81

0.81

0.4

138

342

52

9

0.72

0.72

0.5

71

201

30

6

0.64

0.64

0.6

56

149

20

5

0.60

0.59

0.7

30

91

12

3

0.52

0.52

0.8

11

44

3

1

0.41

0.41

0.9

1

10

1

0

0.29

0.29

1.0

0

0

0

0

0.00

0.00

Table A.6: Dynamics of 4-node motifs remaining (M1 , M2 , M3 , and M4 ), the fraction of load
served, and the fraction of generators operating for the IEEE 118-Bus system under random
attacks (fraction of lines removed).
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Fractionload served

Fractiongenerators operating

M1

0.861

0.863

M2

0.879

0.881

M3

0.877

0.879

M4

0.904

0.906

Table A.7: Correlation coefficients between the remaining 4-node motifs and two electrical
properties (i.e., fraction of load served and fraction of generators operating) by randomly
removing links/edges.

A.4. Sensitive Analysis
Since the proposed methodologies rely on the parametric gamma degradation model, it
is important to investigate the sensitivity of the proposed methods to the mis-specification
of the underlying data generating mechanism. For this purpose, we consider a Monte Carlo
simulation study in which the data are generated from a Wiener process model, which is
a commonly used degradation model for non-monotonic degradation data, and apply the
proposed gamma process model for data analysis. This provides important information to
practitioners to ensure the proposed methodologies are not sensitive to the data generating
mechanism and they will not result in unacceptable changes in the conclusions.
Suppose J represents the total number of 4-node motifs and K represents the total
number of observation points, to generate data from a Wiener process model in our setting,
we define the J -dimensional random vector xi,k = (xi,1,k , xi,2,k , . . . , xi,J ,k )0 ∈ RJ , where
xi,j,k = yi,j,k − yi,j,k+1 , yi,j,k is the 4-node motifs of j-th type for network i at observation
point tk (k = 0, . . . , K), follows a multivariate normal distribution denoted as
MW : xi,k ∼ NJ (µi , Σi ),
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(A.9)

where µi = (µ1 , . . . , µJ )0 ∈ RJ and Σi is a J × J variance-covariance matrix given by




Σi =

2

σi,1




 ρ2,1 σi,2 σi,1




..

.





ρ1,2 σi,1 σi,2

· · · ρ1,J σi,1 σi,J 


2
σi,2

···

..
.

...

ρJ ,1 σi,J σi,1 ρJ ,2 σi,J σi,2 · · ·




ρ2,J σi,2 σi,J 

.


..

.




2

(A.10)

σi,J

Here, µi is the slope of the linear drift and Σi is the diffusion coefficient of the Wiener
process. In the simulation study, to evaluate the performance of the proposed method for
comparing two networks, we generate data for network 1 from a Wiener process model M1W
with parameter vector θ1 = (µ1 , Σ1 ) and data for network 2 from a Wiener process model
M2W with parameter vector θ2 = (µ2 , Σ2 ). The following three settings are considered:
S1. M1W and M2W have same diffusion coefficient but different drifts; motifs are independent:
θ1 = (µ1 , Σ1 ), where µ1 = (1, 1, 1, 1)> and Σ1 =

 0.01 0

0.01

0
0
0.01

0 
0
;
0
0.01

θ2 = (µ2 , Σ1 ), where µ2 = µ1 + a1 with a1 = {0.01, 0.02, · · · , 0.05};
S2. M1W and M2W have the same drift but different diffusion coefficients; motifs are independent:
θ1 = (µ1 , Σ1 ), where µ1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) and Σ1 =
>

 0.01 0

0.01

0
0
0.01

0 
0
;
0
0.01

θ2 = (µ1 , Σ2 ), where Σ2 = a2 × Σ1 and a2 = {1.2, 1.4, · · · , 2.0};
S3. M1W and M2W have the same drift but different diffusion coefficients; motifs are dependent:
θ1 = (µ1 , Σ1 ), where µ1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) and Σ1 =
>

 0.01 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.001 0.01 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.01 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.01

θ2 = (µ1 , Σ02 ), where Σ02 = a02 × Σ1 and a02 = {1.2, 1.4, · · · , 2.0}.
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;

Table A.8 presents the simulated rejection rates based on 10000 simulations. Based on the
simulation results, we observe that when the motifs are independent, even when the data
is generated from a non-gamma model, the proposed gamma process model and the testing
procedure can control the significance level close to the 5% level and provide reasonable
power when the two networks are different. When the motifs are dependent, the simulated
significance level is higher than the nominal 5% level, which indicates that caution needs
to be taken when the underlying model is suspected to be non-gamma and the motifs are
dependent.
Setting S1
µ2

µ1

µ1 + 0.01

Rejection rate

0.056

0.094

µ1 + 0.02 µ1 + 0.03 µ1 + 0.04 µ1 + 0.05
0.136

0.155

0.304

0.414

Setting S2
Σ2

Σ1

Σ1 × 1.2

Σ1 × 1.4

Σ1 × 1.6

Σ1 × 1.8

Σ1 × 2.0

Rejection rate

0.056

0.084

0.150

0.186

0.272

0.402

Setting S3
Σ2

Σ1

Σ1 × 1.2

Σ1 × 1.4

Σ1 × 1.6

Σ1 × 1.8

Σ1 × 2.0

Rejection rate

0.080

0.085

0.134

0.194

0.298

0.372

Table A.8: Simulated rejection rates for settings S1, S2 and S3.

A.5. Computation and Memory Usage

We run our computer programs on Amazon EC2 Bare Metal Instance “m5d.metal" with
96 CPUs and 384 GiB memory. In Table A.9, we present the average running time (in
seconds) and memory used for
(1) motifs calculation;
(2) targeted attacks;
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(3) MLEs calculation of the gamma degradation model;
(4) likelihood ratio test;
(5) partial motifs test;
(6) parametric statistical model (average running time for fitting one dataset);
(7) nonparametric statistical model (average running time for fitting one dataset).
Task

Avg. CPU time

Avg. Memory used

Motifs calculation

6.3 × 10−4 s

736 B

Targeted attacks

2.4 × 10−4 s

824 B

MLEs of model paras. (Equation (3))

1.8 × 10

−1

s

26.8 kB

Likelihood ratio test (Equation (4))

2.1 × 10−1 s

725 B

Partial Motifs Test

1.5 s

102 kB

Parametric statistical model (one time)
Nonparametric statistical model (one time)

2.0 × 10

s

328 kB

1.5 × 10−1 s

498 kB

−1

Table A.9: Average running time and memory used for seven tasks/procedures in this
paper.

A.6. Power Systems from TAMU Repository

Power system

Buses

Generators

Loads

Lines

Transformers

IEEE 118

118

19

91

177

9

ACTIVSg500

500

90

409

597

1

ACTIVSg2000

2,000

544

1,347

2,345

861

Table A.10: Basic components information of three synthetic power systems.
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